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Self-organization can arise in systems where actors interact in non-trivial ways 
and adapt their rule-sets in response to their environment. In the global system of 
environmental governance (GSEG), countries that interact frequently develop cultures of 
practice and aggregate into larger structures or communities. Network analysis provides 
a powerful set of tools to describe the evolution and composition of observed 
communities. Methods developed for bipartite networks are used to consider the 
behavior of countries and agreements simultaneously in the years between 1950 and 
2000. Specifically, the BRIM algorithm, a bipartite adaptation of Newman's eigenvector 
method of community discovery, is implemented to identify the borders of densely 
connected international environmental communities. Our analysis of community 
structure provides a more precise quantification of the evolution of the international 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
The global system of environmental governance (GSEG) is a complex adaptive 
system, where patterns of cooperation and structure emerge in localized groups.  The 
GSEG is not pyramidal with a distinct core and periphery, nor is it chaotic or randomly 
organized (Najam et al., 2004).  Researchers note different national blocs and groups in 
the international system (Depledge, 2006; Najam et al., 2004; Paterson et al., 2003; 
Roberts and Parks, 2007; Victor and Coben, 2005), as well as different lineages of treaties 
and political regimes (Sanwal, 2004; Mitchell, 2002).  There is a large body of research on 
treaties (Mitchell, 2003; Denemark and Hoffman, 2008; Hoffman et al., 2007), but 
insufficient work on synthesizing known relationships between agreements and states, 
mapping bipartite structures, or determining borders of national blocs or treaty regimes.  
Network analysis provides a powerful set of tools to apprehend these complex 
relationships.  In this paper, I examine the development and persistence of communities 
of countries and treaties in the GSEG.  Results provide important insights into global 
political dynamics as well as generate new directions for future research. 
  Political realist and rationalist approaches to international relations suggest that 
environmental cooperation without a strong central authority is untenable.  The optimal 
strategy in one-shot public goods games (absent a coercive central authority) is always 
defection and free-riding the environmental risk mitigation efforts of others.  Yet, over 
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700 multilateral environmental agreements and 1000 bilateral environmental agreements 
have been enacted since the late 19th century (Mitchell, 2003).  Regime theory attempts to 
explain the organization of the international system. Krasner (1982) describes regimes as 
international institutions or agreements that function as frameworks for cooperation.  
These frameworks ease uncertainty, minimize temptations to free-ride, and set in motion 
self-reinforcing processes where “treaty-making begets treaty-making” (Denemark and 
Hoffman, 2008).   
In the GSEG, treaty lineages are path dependent, with initial bargains typically 
followed by periodic amendments, conferences, and protocols. Depledge (2006) 
recognizes that regimes support future cooperation, but notes that regimes can ossify 
and frustrate bargaining efforts in the GSEG.  Ossification results from the formation of 
smaller coalitions meant to reduce the complexity of environmental negotiations 
involving 160 or more countries.  The North / South divide is a common indicator of 
ossification in the global community (Roberts and Parks, 2007). Rather than bridging 
mechanisms, regimes may reinforce historically persistent North / South, East / West or 
G7/G70 divisions.   
Apart from historical or geographical forces, Najam et al. (2004) suggest that 
grouping, clustering, and coalition behavior of nation-states may result from negotiation 
fatigue.  States expend large amounts of resources to participate in environmental 
agreements. States hire legal experts, train delegates, and send diplomats and foreign 
ministers to negotiate strategic bargains. Regimes function to minimize negotiation 
uncertainty and transaction costs.  From this perspective, feedback loops between 
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institutions and treaties, inheritance of practices from one regime or lineage to the next, 
and other underlying pathways (such as personal relationships between foreign 
ministers or shared environmental risks) generate observable aggregations of state-
actors and agreements.  Regime theory has the ability to explain institutional 
cooperation and the clustering behaviors of nation-states but no single institution or 
state can explain the dynamics of the GSEG.  Complexity science offers an approach to 
science that considers the nonlinear, emergent behavior characteristic of the GSEG. 
In complex systems global properties supervene from the interactions of 
component parts, with no single component having properties or behaviors that define 
the system as a whole (Sawyer, 2005).  International relations are composed of multiple 
levels, including individual human beings, non-governmental organizations, nation-
states, and, at the lowest resolution (or highest level), international alliances, regimes 
and blocs of nation-states. The interactions of these different components at each level 
constitute the landscape of international politics.  No single foreign minister, soil quality 
agreement, or NGO has properties of the whole system, and it is the behavior of the 
system as a whole that is most consequential to effective management of the global 
environment.  
Cîndea (2006) maintains that no single factor causes events such as war or 
sustained peace in the international system.  Cîndea employs the concept of an attractor 
from the study dynamical systems to explain system outcomes of war and peace.  
Attractors are the effects of rules that govern actors in complex systems and can be used 
to simplify descriptions of system behavior. In mathematical dynamical systems, a 
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gradual change to a parameter can produce sudden and dramatic changes in attractors.  
New attractors may emerge or configurations that were attractive become repulsive. 
Attractors and the emergence of organization are very common themes in 
complexity science.  From Axelrod’s (1995) Tribute Model “it is possible to use simple 
local rules to generate higher levels of organization from elementary actors.”  Axelrod’s 
Tribute Model was created to lend “abstract plausibility” to a Landscape Theory of 
Aggregation (Axelrod and Bennett, 1993), suggesting that attractors exist to which actors 
in an international system aggregate.  This concept is extended by Macy et al. (2003) 
where actors make binary choices based on the influence of other actors, leading to the 
emergence of polarization.  Macy et al.’s model is very sensitive to initial conditions, and 
parameters defining the initial density of the configuration space determine observed 
basins of attraction.  While different assumptions underwrite these models, they provide 
plausible intuitions for the existence of attractors in the GSEG. 
In the empirical GSEG, many distinct state-actors navigate configurations of 
agreements to sign.  Given the processes of negotiating agreements, the multitude of 
feedback loops that exist within the system, and the tendency for actors to adapt their 
behavior to a changing landscape, I expect aggregate communities to form in the GSEG 
as well. To minimize negotiation costs and fatigue, states gravitate toward attractors in 
configuration spaces of cooperation, representing local minima of frustration. Actor 
behavior in the system is dependent on the status and position of other system actors.  
As actors form clusters and develop cultures of practice, they become increasingly likely 
to sign treaties with countries they signed treaties with in the past.  Like living 
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organisms that transition from single-cellular to multi-cellular life forms, or how 
independent small agrarian villages coalesce into united empires (Turchin, 2009), 
individual nation-states form densely cooperative groups by signing and enacting 
environmental agreements that constitute the GSEG. The large aggregations of densely 
connected countries and agreements that define the GSEG can be derived and observed 
with network scientific tools. 
In this thesis, I will provide precise and comprehensive description of the 
development of the network.  Additionally I will empirically confirm the idea, set forth 
by regime theorists, that regimes are intervening variables within the international 
arena.  Further I will test the idea that throughout the history of the system the structure 
of the network is complex and modular rather than regular or random.  In the next 
chapter I will review relevant literature to public goods and international governance, 
complex systems, and network science.  In chapter three I will discuss the source and 
cleaning of the data as well as the network methods employed.  In chapter four the 
results of the analysis are presented and analyzed.  In chapter five I discuss the findings 








CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND 
 
In the 20th century multilateral treaty-making became the predominant method 
of creating international policy in the global system of environmental governance 
(GSEG).  Aside from crisis-driven interruptions, there has been a steady exponential 
growth in the use of multilateral treaties.  Using Mitchell’s (2003) definition and 
resulting database, there have been over 700 multilateral environmental agreements and 
1000 bilateral environmental agreements since the late 19th century.  Denemark and 
Hoffman (2008) suggest that the rise of treaty-making as the predominant method of 
forging international policy was the result of a self-reinforcing process, that is “treaty-
making begets treaty-making”.  State institutions form internal processes to deal with 
the effects and the preparations of treaties, delegates are trained and experienced with 
treaty-making, and when the need arises to form mutual policy between two or more 
states the diplomats turn to familiar processes.   
Political realism suggests that environmental cooperation without a strong 
central authority is untenable.  Yet cooperation does exist in what is frequently 
considered an anarchic arena.  Regime theory explains the origin of organization in the 
international system as the development of institutions, norms and practices through 
which trust and cooperation can operate (Krasner 1982).  It is often suggested that 
regimes are needed in order to support international cooperation.  Depledge (2006) 
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argues regimes certainly support cooperation, but they can also lead to ossification, a 
withdrawal or complacence within the GSEG.  I focus on one aspect of Depledge’s 
ossification: the strengthening of relationship among participants.  Learning or the 
strengthening of relationships is bounded rather than global and the structure of the 
GSEG has stabilized.  Depledge suggests a number of reasons for the ossification such as 
the formation of smaller coalitions to reduce the complex situation of negotiating 
between 160 or more countries.  The North / South divide is a common case study of 
ossification in the global community (Roberts and Parks, 2007).  Many of these politically 
marginalized countries are located where many of the suspected environmental 
catastrophes  occur and they bear their burden in lives rather than money.  Southern 
countries are often excluded from the creation of international policy so when they have 
the opportunity to exercise their limited power they sometimes use it for revenge on 
Northern countries.  Treaty participation within regimes, rather than bridging regimes, 
is easier but can reify and reinforce the North / South, East / West or Soviet bloc 
divisions.  These structures have become rigid and shape the behavior of environmental 
participation. 
Krasner (1982) suggests regimes are more than just epiphenomenal.  Through 
their interactions states become embedded in larger social systems of norms, rules, and 
institutions and the behaviors; the regimes themselves become ‘intervening variables’.  
Patterns of behavior create regimes and the regimes shape the patterns of behavior.  This 
underlies what Grewal (2006) sees as a paradox of globalization.  Ward describes the 
global stage in terms of network power.  “The notion of network power consists in the 
joining of two ideas: first, that coordinating standards are more valuable when greater 
8 
 
numbers of people use them, and second, that is dynamic … can lead to the progressive 
elimination of the alternatives over which free choice can effectively be exercised” 
(Grewal 2006:4).  This process plays out in global environmental governance whereby 
the emergence of one standard or coalition can preclude the entrance of another.  
Cooperation with one group of states may lead to the exclusion of others.  The GSEG is a 
constant shuffle of freely cooperating states and the slow accretion of norms and rules 
that restrict behavior. 
Apart from basic causal variables such as history or geography many of the 
tightly bounded cooperative groups of nation-states emerged organically from state 
actors exercising free action and navigating a complex political system.  Najam et al. 
(2004) suggest the grouping and clustering may be due to ‘negotiation fatigue.’  States 
expend large amounts of resources to participate in environmental agreements so many 
of the structures that have emerged are the result of states attempting to reduce the 
negotiation costs.  From this perspective feedback loops between institutions and 
treaties, inheritance of practices from one regime or lineage to the next, and other 
underlying pathways (such as social connections between foreign ministers or shared 
environmental cultures) have lead to the appearance of ‘attractors’ to which state-actors 
and agreements have aggregated.  
 
From People to Regimes 
While many states sign treaties because they see it as good governance, other 
nations sign merely to maintain a presence in the system and signal their cooperation.  
Victor and Coben (2005) suggest many instruments were created as a superficial political 
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act.  The authors see price instruments as more effective, yet those that have been 
implemented are too general to be effective.  Quantity-based instruments are more 
common, but less effective.  They believe general price instruments and copious 
quantity instruments (two approaches to regulating emissions) are due to a ‘herd 
mentality’ in the environmental community.  Many countries sign treaties simply to 
remain within the system and rush to sign any treaty they are able to (Roberts et al. 2004; 
Victor and Coben 2005).  These processes mean the existing structure of relationships, 
cultures and practices should be expected to be a significant predictor of future 
behavior. 
International governance is foremost a multi-level process.  It consists not only of 
large international institutions but also the psychological makeup of state delegates, the 
intervention of non-governmental organizations, or the movement of aid.  The 
psychological and philosophical makeup of foreign ministers affect decisions they make 
and that the recommendations of foreign ministers are often taken very seriously by the 
states they represent (Crichlow 2005).  Long-term delegates to environmental 
conferences develop personal relationships (Depledge 2006) and a network of delegates 
and institutional employees exists between organizations established by agreements 
(Selin 2003).  These ties may develop at the institutional or even personal level, but they 
can have a dramatic effect when it comes time to negotiate a new treaty.  The contact 
between delegates can lead the creation of a common culture and practice of negotiation 
at the micro-scale leading to the aggregation of larger structures at a meso-scale. 
 Internal non-governmental organizations and other international organizations 
have a strong influence on a state’s willingness to participate in agreements.  Recchia 
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(2005) argues that “environmental organizations are an effective integrative mechanism 
that can articulate and aggregate environmental interests toward decision makers, elites, 
and the general public.”  Roberts et. al. (2004) found the most significant predictor of 
ratification in their studies is the number of NGOs in the country.  Other research has 
found that transnational social movement organizations, many of which are NGOs, 
increase relative to the flow of aid to a country (Smith and Wiest 2005).  It is possible that 
increased aid in the form of official development assistance (ODA) flows would increase 
NGO presence and therefore participation in environmental agreements.  And since 
many treaties ask richer countries to provide ODA to developing countries in addition 
to reducing their own emissions, a feedback loop between the proliferation of 
environmental agreements and a state’s willingness to participate in environmental 
agreements is created and sustained.   
The citizens of a state can form endemic organizations as well, which are often 
influenced by transnational forces such as cultural attitudes towards the environment or 
the movement of information.  Environmental pressure groups internal to countries are 
the product of what Steinberg (2003) calls “bilateral activists,” individuals who have a 
connection to the foreign ideas and funding catalytic to foundation and funding of 
environmental organizations.  These organizations in turn try to increase funding to 
their programs and encourage the state to increase participation in international 
agreements through citizen mobilization and lobbying efforts.  The environmental 
organizations and their connections to the international community facilitate a feedback 
loop between the number of environmental pressure groups and environmental 
agreements and each works to sustain the other. 
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 The transfer of ideas in a democratic state is important to the formation of groups 
that influence state activities (Steinberg 2003; Smith and Wiest 2005; Roberts et al. 2004; 
Paterson et al. 2003).  Paterson et al. (2003) argue that governance of the environment 
relies on the priority environmental values receive relative to other values.    Right now 
consensus in many countries has not been reached and it presents a significant hurdle to 
negotiation.  But nation states are open systems to global culture.  A change in one 
country has the ability to affect other states.  David Frank argues that the global culture 
has altered its perception of nature and the government’s role in preserving it over the 
past century (Frank et al. 2000; Frank 1997).  Frank suggests the perception of nature in 
the 20th century which moved away from the idea of nature as provider or feral to nature 
as a life-sustaining ecology and thus prompted increased public interest in its protection 
(Frank, 1997).   
Globally the concept that the state should be a steward of the natural 
environment was soon integrated into the ‘blueprint’ of state government (Frank et al. 
2000).  Meyer et al. (1997) suggest the structure of international environmental 
governance is the result of associational arenas (such as the U. N.) and the “expansion of 
rationalized and authoritative scientific interpretation, which structures perceptions of 
common environmental problems”.  Another feedback loop between the government 
structures and global culture surrounding the role of government and environment 
developed driving global discourse and internal changes.  Participation in international 
agreements became a part of being a national steward of nature and the process 
reinforced itself.  But while cultural interpretations may help explain increased 
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participation, it does not satisfactorily answer the Balkanization or modularity of the 
GSEG. 
 Increased symmetry of environmental values and norms can form the basis of 
trusting relationships.  Tennberg (2007) suggests many dimensions of trust: an 
expectation that obligations will be fulfilled, that knowledge is reliable and available, 
and that one can be safe putting their success in the hands of others.  Interviews among 
environmental project managers involved in long term cooperation assessed their trust 
levels very positively.  Trust in others involved in conferences is key; ‘disrupters’ can 
sometimes appear at conferences dedicated to ruining or controlling the conference to 
their own benefits (Depledge, 2006).  Sometimes Southern countries seek vengeance on 
Northern countries for perceived past wrongs in other environmental treaties and make 
unreasonable demands and stifle cooperation when they have the opportunity (Roberts 
and Parks, 2007).  DeCremer (1999) peformed psychological experiments on public 
goods found reducing the level of fear that other participants will exploit them 
improved cooperation.  Ensuring that those who cause fear of exploitation are excluded 
from negotiations may improve cooperation on agreements, but it also fuels division in 
the GSEG.  Trust builds on cooperation and cooperation feeds on trust.  It is therefore 
expected that communities of reciprocity and trust, once established, will self-sustain. 
 The many levels and systems of trade, culture, institutions and individuals 
conspire to structure the international environmental system.  Structure emerges 
spontaneously within this system without any strong top-down governors. There are 
many real mechanisms in the negotiation of treaties that facilitate the creation of these 
aggregates.  The first is geography.  Clearly states have an easier time negotiating with 
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those who are near to them; in addition many geographically close state actors share 
similar environmental concerns (such as water resources, deforestation and 
desertification, and biodiversity).  The other is the act of negotiation.  Many similar 
treaties could be debated simultaneously among many actors in order to reduce the cost 
of negotiation.  In addition to allowing the creation of aggregates this also leads to the 
creation of treaty lineages.  If a large treaty is created and signed, then it is expected that 
the group of countries invited to the original signing would be invited back in the event 
of amendments or additional protocols.  The GSEG is massively complex with many 
elements interacting across many levels.  Regimes emerge as political forces because 
cooperation itself, while simple when reduced to one-shot games, becomes complex 
when embedded in repeated interaction embedded in a large international system. 
 
 
Complexity of Cooperation 
 Hardin (1965) presents a metaphor for the commons as a field that anyone can 
use to graze their goats.  Due to political strife, famine, and other causes of death the 
population remains in check and the commons remains stable.  After a sustained period 
of peace, industrial, and economic development the population booms and soon the 
commons is flooded with goat herders.  The commons is quickly reduced to sand.  
Hardin suggests the tragedy of the commons is very similar to a game a tic-tac-toe, one 
could try to look for a perfect winning strategy, but it logically does not exist.  The only 
winning option is to abandon the game entirely; there is no technical solution.  Hardin 
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suggests problems such as these require extending moral progress to reign in freedoms 
in the interest of sustaining society.  
A simple two-player game underlying the tragedy of the commons is the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma.  The name of the game is derived from the most common fictional 
scenario used to describe it.  Two suspects are arrested by police, but the police do not 
have enough information to convict either of them.  The officers independently try to 
convince the captives to provide information enough for a conviction.  There are four 
outcomes to the game detailed in Table 2.1.  If both suspects remain silent they will both 
be convicted on a lesser charge and receive only 6 months.  If they both confess, they 
will both serve 5 years.  If only one suspect confesses while the other remains silent, the 
confessor is let go while the silent suspect is sentenced to 10 years in prison, this is called 
the “sucker’s payoff”.  Cooperation in this game is defined as cooperation between the 
suspects (that is, they both remain silent), while defection is a confession.  In a single play 
of this game, the optimal solution for a single player is to confess, however the optimal 
solution for the system of both players is to always stay silent. 
 
Table 2.1. Outcomes for Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 
  Suspect 2 Stays Silent Suspect 2 Confesses 
Suspect 1 Stays Silent Both serve 6 months 
Suspect 2 goes free 
Suspect 1 serves 10 years 
Suspect 1 Confesses 
Suspect 1 goes free 
Suspect 2 serves 10 years 
Both serve 5 years 
 
This simple game gave birth to an entire branch of mathematics and decision 
science known as game theory.  Computer simulations are a frequent tool used to 
explore the dimensions of choice in these games.  Axelrod (1984) invited people to 
submit strategies for tournament of iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, the game is played 
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repeatedly with the same computer players.  He found the most successful (and very 
simple) strategy was Tit-for-Tat (TFT) wherein a player starts by cooperating and does 
what the other player did in the last turn.  TFT’s success is due to its ability to sustain 
cooperative streaks and not descend into continuous punishment.  Axelrod’s 
‘competition’ demonstrated that although there were a number of reasonable strategies 
for iterated prisoner’s dilemma, there was a clear optimal strategy.  It also showed that 
not only is cooperation possible, but that even small populations of cooperators can 
swing the entire system into cooperation. 
 The public goods game, unlike Prisoner’s Dilemma, is played by many players 
with a single pool of resources.  Public goods are characterized on two dimensions, they 
are non-excludable, meaning no individual can be prevented from consuming the good, 
and they are non-rivalrous, meaning that one individual’s consumption does not affect 
any other individual’s consumption (Olson, 1971; Grunberg et al., 1999; Ferroni et al., 
2002).  Because of the non-exclusivity dimension it is possible for players to free-ride.  
The action with the highest expected payoff, the rational choice, in one-shot plays of the 
game is to always free-ride.   
While often rational, humans are not computer programs.  The actors in real 
systems often have frequent interactions and a number of variables can affect 
contribution such as communication between parties, repeated iterations of the game, or 
non-economic motives such as respect, status, or trust (DeCremer 1999; DeCremer 2006; 
DeCremer 2003).  The structure of networks has also been found to intervene on the 
outcome of cooperation. Cooperation will spread faster and have better success in scale-
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free1 networks than in a regular lattice (Santos et al. 2008).  Regular lattices look like a 
chicken wire fence where the structure is consistent throughout, but scale-free networks 
have a few players that have a great many connections while most players have only a 
few.  The scale-free topology encourages more universal cooperation and larger payoffs 
overall, but they also create a more uneven distribution of wealth and power. 
Within the scope of global politics, central authorities do not exist which can 
completely govern global resources.  Instead the complexity and structure of such 
systems and their tendency to self-organize is a powerful tool for cooperation and 
managing the commons.  Ostrom (Ostrom and Gardner 1993; Ostrom 1999; Ostrom 
2000; Ostrom 2009) suggests that social-ecological systems are complex systems 
consisting of micro-organisms, ecologies, local farmers or fisheries, local governments, 
state and federal governments, non-profit organizations, etc. that all interact with each 
other.  Depending on the different rule-sets and norms, successful socio-ecological 
systems can self-organize into sustainable, self-governing systems.  The different rules of 
the system include boundary rules which define what an agent of the system is, or rules 
for conflict-resolution, or payoff rules that adjust how costs and benefits are managed.  
A number of these rules exist through norms or explicitly in the GSEG and they alter 
how state actors behave.  The rules change the behavior of the actors and the actors can 
change the rules.  Through this constant feedback, actors are connected to one another 
and form a complex adaptable whole.  It could emerge as a self-sustaining entity or 
collapse creating room for new systems to coalesce.  A proper rule-set can create a 
system where cooperation is a stable attractor, if only locally.  
                                                          





When small components interact and respond to other components, without any 
central director, to form a structure larger than themselves, that structure is said to have 
self organized.  Self organization is an important phenomena in chemistry, physics, and 
biology as well as sociology and political science.  In human dynamics lines and 
pathways emerge in crowds, neighborhoods emerge in cities, political parties emerge 
from interaction and sharing of opinions, and international regimes emerge from the 
historical interactions of state actors.  In the same way line in a crowd persists because it 
represents a path of least resistance, regimes may persist because the represent the path 
of least resistance to international governance.  
The importance and power of self organization can be demonstrated through 
agent-based models (ABM) (Shalizi 2006).  ABMs are computer simulations where 
synthetic agents, each with their own properties, navigate a landscape and interact with 
each other.  These models display many of the same non-linear or discontinuous 
properties of real world social systems.  Schelling’s (1978) segregation model is a very 
simple example of nonlinearity and rule based interaction resulting in large structures.  
Schelling’s model considers a checkerboard neighborhood where black and red pieces 
live.  If a black piece’s neighborhood does not consist of a certain proportion of other 
black pieces, it will move to a random empty location somewhere else on the board.  It 
will continue to move until it has found a place that satisfies its preferences.  Only a 
slight preference for similarity can lead to almost complete segregation.  And while 
predicting the outcome of any single actor on the board is subject to immense error, 
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predictions about the outcome of the whole can be reliably accurate (e.g. an individual 
preference for at least 30% similarity leads to an overall segregation of about 75%). 
 
 
Figure 1.1. A NetLogo example of the Schelling Segregation Model run until 
all agents are “happy” (Wilensky 1997). 
 
 
Axelrod’s (1995) simulation of independent political units, the Tribute model, 
demonstrates that a set of agents with random starting positions can aggregate into 
larger structures that act as a whole.  Over 1,000 iterations (“years”) actors make 
demands of other actors and decide whether to fight the aggressor or pay up.  Over time 
commitments and alliances form and strengthen to the point that one set of actors is 
completely committed to each other and not at all committed to the others.   This results 
in (typically) two large, cohesive units that fight one another instead of the 10 actors that 
existed initially.  No central director commands the agents to aggregate into structures; 
instead the behavior is the result of rule-based interactions.  
The perspective of complexity, of which self-organization is a key concept, is 
ideal for analyzing the international environmental arena, and a wealth of empirical 
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evidence already exists to support many of its theoretical assertions.  With this in mind 
many researchers have begun to view the history of politics through the lens of 
complexity.  Hoffman (2006) applied ideas of complexity to help explain the shift from a 
‘North-only’ participation model in the ozone depletion regime to one of universal 
participation.  International agreements related to ozone depletion occurred in several 
steps and after each agreement was made an evaluation of the results altered the rule-
sets of many of the actors.  The altered rule sets resulted in a change in global outcomes 
of the system.  Although he did not apply them in his study, Hoffman advocates the use 
of ABMs to demonstrate “the abstract plausibility, though not the empirical validity, of 
the explanation for regime transformation” he developed.  Cîndea (2006) explains that 
the international system is incredibly complex and no single factor can be considered the 
cause of events such as war or sustained peace.  Cîndea employs the concept of an 
‘attractor’ from the study dynamical systems to help explain the dynamics of war and 
peace.  An attractor, as Cîndea describes, is like the center of a tornado, it is not the cause 
of the movement of air but the air is moving towards it.  Attractors are the effects of the 
rules that govern actors in complex systems and can be used to simplify descriptions of 
a system. 
Agent based models suggest the existence of attractors in the GSEG and the 
Tribute model was created to lend ‘abstract plausibility’ to the Landscape Theory of 
Aggregation (Axelrod and Bennett 1993) which suggests that attractors exist to which 
actors in the international system gravitate.  His explanation for the aggregation of 
actors is that attractors exist in the configuration space based on the initial conditions.  
There are many important similarities between the assumptions of the Tribute Model 
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and the GSEG.  Over time many states develop binding agreements with one another 
that may preclude similar agreements with other states precipitating the emergence of 
larger political units.  Given the processes of negotiating agreements, the multitude of 
feedback loops that exist within the system, and the tendency for actors to adapt their 
behavior to a changing landscape I expect aggregates to form in the GSEG as well. 
 
Network Analysis 
 Every actor in the GSEG can be considered a part of a large global network.  Each 
makes free choices in relation to other actors in the network.  These choices accrete and 
converge on standards which then confine choices.  This perspective “allows us to 
maintain our common-sense view of people as reasonable, choosing agents while 
simultaneously allowing that those doing the choosing may be subject to a form of 
external compulsion” (Gewal 2006).  This perspective expands Krasner’s (1982) 
description of regimes and exposes their complexity.   
Network analysis concerns the study of networks composed of nodes and edges, 
where nodes are entities connected to one another through edges.  I use network 
analysis to describe the evolution of the environmental regime network over time.  
Network analysis bridges a wide range of substantive arenas (Bhadra et al., 2008) and 
network analysis is not new to the study of political networks or international relations 
(Hafner-Burton et al., 2009).  Faber (1987) used information from the Conflict and Peace 
Databank to construct an international diplomatic network and applied confirmatory 
factor analysis on a correlation network to identify communities.  Grossman and 
Dominguez (2009) used a projection of a bipartite network to study patterns of funding 
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between political candidates and interest groups.  Waugh et al. (2009) use modularity 
maximized community discovery to study party loyalty and polarization in the US 
congress, finding a non-monotonic relationship between network modularity and 
changes in majority party.  Hoffman et al. (2007) used network analysis to study multi-
lateral treaties between countries, deploying a country-by-country unipartite projection 
at four time points with a cutoff of 4 common treaties to dichotomize the network.  
Ward (2006) also projects the two-mode network of countries and treaties into a one 
mode network, but instead treats it as a weighted network.  The research found 
significant correlations between centrality and sustainability. 
New methods are frequently developed to tackle larger and more complex 
problems related to the study of networks.2  In this work I focus on two methodologies 
which have not yet been applied to the study international agreements to detail the 
modular structure that binds the GSEG. The first set of methodologies focus on 
statistical analysis of bipartite networks.  A bipartite network is one in which two colors 
can be used to color every node in the network in such a way that no two nodes of the 
same color share an edge.  Many social networks are composed of two different 
elements.  Whether women and the clubs they attend, students and classes, or nation-
                                                          
2 In addition to network analytic tools, agent based models are often used to explain the 
dynamics and formation of structure in networks, with some researchers modeling 
bipartite networks in particular.  For example, Saavedra, Reed-Tsochas, and Uzzi’s 
(2009) model cooperation by specifying two mechanisms, specialization and interaction, 
that lead to the emergence of community structure in bipartite networks.  Specialization 
specifies how many other actors a node interacts with, and interaction specifies which 
nodes an actor interacts with.  These agent rules adequately recreate observed 




states and the international agreements they sign, there exist two distinct and 
interdependent sets: actors and events.  Many researchers reduce bipartite networks to a 
single mode weighted network by assigning arbitrary cut-offs.  This betrays the 
underlying structure and reduces the structural role of one half of the vertices in the 
network to a weight rather than a unique entity. Methods developed specifically for 
bipartite networks have few of these problems and can study both sets of vertices in 
detail. 
The second set of methodologies focus on identifying dense subgroups of 
networks and tracking their evolution over time.  A network can often be divided into 
communities or subsets of the nodes within the network that are more likely to share 
edges with each other than they are to nodes outside the communities.  While a wide 
array of community detection algorithms have been developed for one-mode networks 
(Fortunato, 2009), methods for two-mode networks have been slow in coming 
(Sawardecker et al., 2009).  I use an implementation of the BRIM algorithm (Barber, 2007) 
to define community structure of our bipartite network without reduction.3  The BRIM 
algorithm is based Newman’s (2006a) method of finding communities using the 
eigenvectors of a modularity matrix.  The modularity matrix is based on a null model of 
network connectedness that assumes the likelihood of any two nodes connecting is 
relative to the degree of both nodes.  In effect, modularity is a measure of the deviation 
from the null model of a given grouping of nodes in a network.   
                                                          
3 Other methods have been developed for finding communities in networks 
(Sawadecker et al. 2009) and BRIM was found comparable to the method based on 
simulated annealing developed by Guimera, Sales-Pardo, and Amaral (2007).  Both 
methods demonstrate better accuracy than clique-based methods.   
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An entire class of community discovery algorithms has been designed on the 
basis of maximizing modularity.  The BRIM algorithm and others (Fortunato, 2009) 
build off previous work by Newman (2006b) on measures of assortativity and 
modularity in networks.  These methods provide researchers with a quick and reliable 
way of studying community structure in complex networks.  Recently there has been 
interest in the study of how community structure changes over time (Palla et al., 2007; 
Mucha et al., 2009; Rosvall and Bergstrom, 2009).  Palla et al. (2007) developed a method 
of linking found communities across time points as well as new measures describing 
communities and their behavior over time.  These methods are elaborated in the data 








CHAPTER 3: DATA AND METHODS 
 
The data come from the online database Environmental Treaties and Resource 
Indicators (ENTRI) developed by the Center for International Earth Science Information 
Network at Columbia University (http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/entri/).  The data 
were cleaned to remove agreements which never had a signatory in the sample period 
and to remove signatories which are not considered state actors or countries (such as the 
Cayman Islands and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN).  The list of all 
agreements and state actors can be found in Appendix A.  The treaties are considered 
international environmental agreements (or IEAs) since they include treaties, 
amendments, protocols and other agreements (Mitchell, 2003).  I use the terms IEA and 
agreement interchangeably through the rest of the thesis.  The data cover IEAs signed 
from 1868 through the first few months of 2000.  Our analysis covers the 51 years from 
1950 through 2000, a period where the bulk of IEAs are signed. Countries in the dataset 
are also identified by their UN region and ENTRI has created key words to describe the 
nature or purpose of an agreement or treaty. 
To examine the network consider a bipartite graph with two different node sets 
(Faust, 1997; Borgatti and Everett, 1997; Latapy et al., 2008).  In the network, the first 
node set is the set of state actors engaged in signing IEAs, and the second node set is the 
IEAs that countries sign.  Countries connect to IEAs by signing them.  Countries are only 
 
connected to other countries through the IEAs they co
IEAs and countries is generated for each year (
signed agreement j by a year 
By using a bipartite network 
and avoid the structural data loss that occurs through unipartite projection.  
Additionally, results of community discovery in a weighted unipartite projection are 
often uncorrelated with observed communities in original bipartite networks 
(Sawadecker et al., 2009).  Man
a binary network using a cut
of k or greater is considered a link while anything less than 
Analysis of the bipartite network includes all edges in the analysis.  With a bipartite 
network the role of the countries and IEAs can be analyzed in tandem.  In addition to 
examining key countries in the system, one can also identify the most central IEAs and 
their modular role in the network.  
I calculate the 
is a measure of a node’s tendency to be in between two random nodes in a network.  
When a theoretical message (or behavior) travels between any two poin
and takes the shortest route 
betweenness nodes than low betweenness nodes.  The betweenness of node 
by: 
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-sign.  A rectangular m
t) where the entry 
t or earlier and 0 otherwise.  
one can study both classes of nodes simultaneously 
y researchers simplify the weighted network by creating 
-point, k, to remove the weighting.  Any edge with a weight 
k is dropped from analysis.  
 
betweenness centrality for each node in then network.  Betweenness 
possible, it is more likely to travel
   
atrix Aijt of 
aij = 1 if country i 
ts in the network 
 through high 
v is defined 
 
where  is the number
 is the number of shortest paths between 
node v.  Betweenness for node 
network where s is not equal to 
 Figure 3.1 illustrates a simple network 
degree centrality of a node is the number of edges incident on (connected to) a node.  The 
degree distribution is on the right of the diagram.  The degree distribution can be a simple 
way of understanding the stru
by many nodes with few connections and few nodes with many connections (the 
distribution is typically characterized by a power law).
useful to show the difference
the diagram both nodes C and E have the same degree centrality, 4, but node E has a 
higher betweenness centrality.  This 
other node in the network 
network.  While for node C it is possible to access nodes A, B, and D along a shortest 
path without having to traverse C at all.
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 of shortest paths between two random nodes 
s and t that also go through the subject 
v is this fraction summed for all pairs of nodes in the 
t. 
diagrammed on the left
cture of a network.  Scale-free networks are characterized 
  The network 
 between betweenness centrality and degree centrality.  In 
is because any paths between 
will travel through E, thus E is between many nodes in the 
 
Figure 3.1. Simple Network Example 
s and t and 
 of the figure.  The 
in Figure 3.1 is also 




As part of this research we would like to confirm the GSEG is a complex system, 
and one property of complex systems is their balance on the edge of chaos.  A complex 
system is neither a random network nor a model of perfect order such as a crystal. 
Prokopenko et al. (2007) suggest measuring the level of assortative noise in a system to 
estimate its entropy.  A network with little assortative noise has greater predictive 
efficiency.  In this article I use a measure based on assortativity called modularity 
(Newman, 2006a).  To estimate modularity, I use the bipartite recursively induced 
modules (BRIM) algorithm (Barber, 2007). The BRIM algorithm is built from Newman’s 
(2006b) method that exploits the eigenvectors of the modularity matrix to constantly 
partition a network.  Since the modularity matrix of a bipartite network is rectangular 
rather than square, the BRIM algorithm uses a generalization of singular value 
decomposition to recursively generate the modules.   
To evaluate the partitioning of the network I compare it against a null model of 
network connectedness.  Consider our IEA network with p agreements and q countries 
that form a p x q incidence matrix at time t, At, and let ki be the degree of the agreements 
and dj be the degree of the countries.  The null probability, Pij, that agreement i connects 
to country j is equal to  

	
, where m is the number of edges in the network, and 
thus the modularity matrix is defined as: 

      
I assign agreements and countries to communities using two binary index matrices 
where each column of the matrix represents a community: Rp x c = [ r1 | r2 |  | rc ] for 
agreements and Tq x c = [ t1 | t2 |  | tc ] for countries and c is the number of 
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communities.  Each row of the matrices sum to 1 and represent an individual agreement 
or country so that each node is assigned to one community.  Using the modularity 





The community vectors  are initialized by assigning each country randomly to a 
community and re-write the equation for modularity so that  

	
  where 
  .  Since the rows of the matrix R consist of a single 1 with the rest as 0, to 
maximize Q the element of each row of R is chosen so that the corresponding value of  
is the maximum.  While the assignment of countries is initially random, agreements are 
chosen so that the selection maximizes Q.  Then the equation is rewritten again ( 

	
 where   ) and countries are assigned to communities such that Q is 
maximized.  The process takes advantage of the bipartite nature of the network to 
induce the modules.  Hence the name of the algorithm: bipartite recursively induced 
modules (BRIM). 
To find the number of communities in the network the algorithm is run 500 
times, assuming 2 through 30 initial communities.  After 14,500 runs of the algorithm, 
the set of R and T index matrices that produce the highest measure of modularity, Q, is 
the partitioning of the network that is kept.  This process is performed on the 
accumulated network generated at each time point from 1950 to 2000.  Although the 
algorithm can be initialized with 2 or more communities, there is no check to ensure 
communities are not left empty.   
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To identify communities across time points, Palla et al. (2007) advanced a 
method of linking a community discovered at an initial time point (t0) to a different 
community in the next time point (t1).  The method relies on generating an un-weighted 
union graph containing all links and nodes across time points.  The communities are 
connected to the union graph by comparing the node overlap. 
 
Figure 3.2. Matching of communities from t to t+1 using a union graph (reprinted 
from Palla et al., 2007, © 2007 by the Nature Publishing Group). 
 
Six possible behaviors of communities can be captured: birth, death, growth, 
contraction, merging, and splitting.  For instance, if a majority of vertices in community 
c1 at time t0 are also found in u1 in the union graph, but in time t1 two communities c4 and 
c5 in the network also have most of their vertices in u1, then c1 connects to both c4 and c5 
in time t1 and c1 is considered split.  The community c1 is then matched to either c4 or c5 
(whichever has the highest node overlap) and the remaining community is considered to 
have been born.  The merging of communities is tracked in a very similar fashion.  
Figure 3.2 shows an example of community matching using a union graph.  Time point t 
is in blue and time t+1 is in yellow.   
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Once the communities are identified over time they can be analyzed for their 
lifespan, their size, and their stationarity (Palla et al., 2007).  The correlation of a 
community A between birth and some time point t is described as CA(t), 
 
where is the intersection of the nodes in community A at time t0 and 
time t0 +t and  is the union of the nodes in both time points.  The 
average correlation between each time is described by , 
 
where tmax time point of the death of the community and t0 is the birth.  The average 
correlation is referred to as the stationarity and is a measure of retention in the 
community ranging from 0 to 1.  A community with a stationarity of 1 has the exact 
same members between each time step, while a stationarity of 0 has none of the same 
members between any two time steps.  The left community in Figure 3.2 has a 
stationarity of 0.66 (four communities that persist in both time points, divided by 6 in 
the union graph) and the right has a stationarity of 0.80 (four in both, divided by five in 
the union).   
Figure 3.3 provides examples of the 6 scenarios in the evolution of communities.  
Nodes and edges never decay in the GSEG network, so death is an impossible scenario.  
Communities only decay when they merge into a more dominant community.  




Figure 3.3.  Possible scenarios in the evolution of communities (reprinted from Palla 
et al., 2007, © 2007 by the Nature Publishing Group). 
 
Examples of how the BRIM algorithm identifies communities can be found in 
Figure 3.4.  The top row of nodes can be thought of as agreements while the second row 
could be considered states.  In the first box (a-c) shows what occurs with different 
configurations of edges.  In a) the graph has a strong coupling between the two 
communities, in b) the communities are more separated resulting in a higher value of 
modularity (0.42).  In the last graph in the box, c), two communities are completely 
disconnected resulting in a modularity of 0.50.  The second column of graphs shows 
what happens in the addition of new nodes.  A single agreement is signed by the two 
middle states (after graph d)).  Graph e) shows the results from the algorithm when only 
two communities are searched for.  In graph f) the number of assumed communities is 
three.  In this example the algorithm finds a higher modularity if three communities are 
assumed rather than two.  The three community solution is considered a better 
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representation of the community structure.  Finally in graph g) modularity increases 
when a new agreement is added to which only the blue community signs.  In the GSEG 
many of the increases to modularity are due to communities signing new agreements 
where signatories are all within a single community. 
 












CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
  
I divide the analysis of the GSEG into three parts.  First I analyze the network for 
basic statistics such as the number of actors over time , the mean degree, and centrality.    
Second I look at overall community evolution noting the lifespan, size, and stationarity 
of observed communities.  Third I walk through the evolution of network as visualized 
through network diagrams. 
Network Statistics 
 Figure 4.1 shows the number of IEAs and countries by year.  In 1950, there were 
few IEAs relative to the number of countries (23 IEAs and 80 countries).  Around 1970 
the number of new IEAs signed relative to the number of new active countries increased.  
By 1982 there are more IEAs signed than countries signing them.  By 2000, the network 




Figure 4.1: Size of Network over Time 
 
 IEAs and countries displayed very different behaviors in the network.  The 
degree distribution among countries was roughly log-normal throughout the sample 
period.  It was most likely that countries signed at least a few agreements throughout 
the sample period, while a statistically few number of countries signed only a few 
agreements and few countries signed a great deal of agreements.  Most of the high-
signing states are in Europe and sign many global agreements as well as many Euro-
centric agreements.   
Each state continued to sign more and more agreements each year in the sample 
period.  The mean number of IEAs signed by countries increased linearly each year by 
0.65 (±0.04) from 6.8 to 40.3.  The number of countries that had signed each IEA (the 
degree of the agreements) had a very long tail, approximating a power law. Most 
agreements had only a few signatories, while a small number of agreements were signed 
by nearly the entire system.  I fit a power law distribution to the IEA degree distribution 
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(Clauset et al., 2009) at each time point to examine the trend in the exponent.  The xmin 
was determined using the power law fit program in the igraph package in R.  The α-
exponent was 2.33 (±0.50) throughout the sample period.  While the mean number of 
signatures per state increased throughout the sample period the mean degree of IEAs 
varied between 20 and 24.  The trend in the mean size of agreements is shown in Figure 
4.2. 
 
Figure 4.2: Mean IEA Degree over Time 
 
In the final accumulated signature network in 2000, countries were on average 
far more central in terms of betweenness4 compared to agreements (p<0.001).  The top 10 
agreements and countries, ranked by betweenness centrality are shown in Table 4.1.  
The top agreements were more central than the top countries.  Agreements tie the 
system together more than the states themselves.  The most central agreements by 
keyword were those related to sea jurisdiction, legal and intuitional questions, and the 
atmosphere.  The topics of these agreements tend to transcend regional boundaries as all 
                                                          
4 Betweenness is defined in Chapter 3: Methods and Data. 
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the skies, oceans, and legal/financial organizations are connected or strongly coupled.  
Participation in these topics is necessarily trans-boundary or global.   
Community Structure 
 The BRIM algorithm found between 4 and 8 communities at each time point, far 
below the maximum searched of 30.  Values for modularity can range from 0 to 1.  If 
Q=0 then there is one community and all nodes belong to it; if Q=1 then there are as 
many communities as there are nodes and each node belongs to its own community.  
Neither scenario indicates a complex community structure.  Meaningful values for Q lie 
between these two extremes.  The modularity of the IEA network over time is displayed 
in Figure 4.3.   
 
Figure 4.3: Modularity of Network over Time 
 
Modularity varied between a minimum of Q =0.24 in 1950 to maximum of 
Q=0.34 in 1965 indicating an increase of intra-community environmental activity.  
Although the degree to which it is divided into communities varies over the sample 
period, the network is clearly complex and displays and emergent structure (Newman 
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2006b; Hoffman 2006).  Modularity declined from its peak in 1965 to Q=0.29 in 1978, 
following multiple global agreements that bridged observed communities.  The 
modularity from 1985 through 2000 has remained somewhat stable around 0.31 
although the number of agreements signed increased.  This result indicates in the past 15 
years there has been little disturbance to the community structure of the system.  New 
agreements recreate the structure as the system develops standards and norms that 
reinforce the boundaries or modules that had developed over the previous century 
(Grewal 2006; Krasner 1982).  By about 1985 the system has ossified (Depledge 2006) and 
community structure had reached a stable state. 
 The community matching algorithm found 25 unique communities tracked over 
the sample period that either existed at the beginning or emerged at some point during 
the sample period.  The mean lifespan of observed communities is 10.3 years.  There 
were 10 communities lasting 2 years or less which occasionally split from larger 
communities, possibly a result of the random starting conditions of the algorithm.  Two 
communities lasted the entire period of 51 years from 1950 through 2000.  There were 
seven communities with a lifespan of 10 years or more; I focus on these communities 
because of their reliability. 
Figure 4.4 shows the size of the communities and the movement of network 
actors between the communities.  Only communities with a lifespan greater than 3 years 
are displayed.  The diagram starts at the bottom in 1950 and proceeds up to the most 
recent configuration in 2000.  Communities are labeled by the order of their birth or 
emergence (C01 is first, C02 second and so on).  The lifespan and growth of 
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communities, as well as the movement of actors in the network between communities 
are evident.  Each community is represented as a vertical line.  The width of the line 
indicates the number of countries in the community at that time.  Splits and merges are 











Communities are born when new sets of countries or agreements enter the 
system.  A set of countries could enter the system on a treaty they all share, such as 
many African nations in 1960  (C12)  with the signing of the Constitution of the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, or a community is born by 
splitting from a larger existing community.  A split typically occurs when a new 
agreement or lineage of agreements start among a subset of countries within an existing 
community.  This can create a denser region of the community such that modularity is 
higher if this new dense region is mathematically rendered a new community.  Pacific 
nations can be seen splitting and merging from C02 and C12 three times because of 
many regulatory agreements on the use of the sea, such as whaling and transportation 
restrictions.  This behavior can be best understood by referring to Figure 3.4.d-g.  The 
Pacific regime has a number of agreements of which only its members have signed, this 
typically means that the algorithm will find a higher modularity for the system 
whenever the Pacific regime is defined as its own community.  But many of the 
members, such as the United States and Japan, sign many agreements outside of the 
community.  As these members sign more agreements outside the community 
modularity is not optimized by defining the Pacific regime as a community, but as new 
agreements are signed within the Pacific regime, or new actors (such as some South 
Pacific island nations) join the GSEG within the Pacific regime modularity is again 
optimized by defining a Pacific community. 
Between 1950 and about 1970 the formation of new communities was as much 
driven by the addition of new agreements as it was the addition of new countries.  
Between 1980 and 1991 the number of countries in the system saturated and any changes 
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to the structure of the system were caused by the entrance of new agreements. Since 
signed IEAs are never considered to have left the system, communities only die when 
they are absorbed. Community absorption occurs when countries in a delineated 
community sign enough common agreements with countries from other communities – 
a process of inter-community cooperation. 
Over the time period examined, about 5 communities are observed at each time 
point, with a floor count of 4 communities.5  At a general level, five communities appear 
to stabilize following the saturation of new state actors.  These large aggregations define 
the present period of the GSEG, and are observable in Figure 4.4 at the top of the graph: 
Europe; Central Asia and developing nations; South and Central America; Pacific nations; and 
African, Southeast Asian and Central Asian nations.   
Interestingly, countries that comprise these communities are not always 
geographically proximate or regional neighbors.  This suggests modules / regimes exist 
as a phenomenon independent of geography and geo-politics and act as an intervening 
variable in the creation and signing of IEAs (Krasner 1982).  The geographical 
distribution of communities over time is shown in Figure 4.5.  The maps depict the 
network at 4 time points, representing the first year of analysis (1950), the point of the 
highest measured modularity (1965), the local minimum measured modularity (1978), 
and the last year of analysis (2000).  Countries in white have not been recorded as 
having signed an agreement by that time.  Countries with matched color are part of the 
same community. 
                                                          
5 A high number of communities observed in a given year may be a function of 










The exact assignment of all the nodes in the network to each community can be 
found in Appendix B
possible to see the path
time.  Agreements are listed first, followed by countries.  The full names of each of the 
nodes can be found in Appendix A.  
Community Evolution 1950
Detailed statistics on 15 communities a
figures on community lifespan, the mean number of countries and agreements 
constituting a community, and stationarity estimates.
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of Longest
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.  Each community is uniquely colored.  From Appendix B it is 
 each state actor or agreement takes through the system over 
 
-2000 








Communities with a very low stationarity, but a long lifespan would be interesting.  
They would represent something like a whirlpool in the GSEG, indicating some 
property of the global system tends to make states and agreements come together only 
to move on to new more stable positions.  In general communities with a higher 
stationarity also had a higher lifespan.  Communities C18 and C12 have somewhat low 
stationarity for their lifespan, indicating that these countries and agreements circulated 
attractors based on the rules inherent to the system rather than merely following 
political or geographical boundaries (Axelrod and Bennett 1993; Axelrod 1995; Cîndea 
2006). 
Network diagrams are presented in Figures 4.6-4.11 showing the evolution of the 
network every decade between 1950 through 2000.   The position of nodes are 
determined using a force-layout method (Force Atlas layout in Gephi6).  In force-layouts 
the nodes are repulsed from one another if they are too close, but attracted to each other 
if they share an edge between them.  The nodes start with a random position then from 
the “physical” forces of attraction and repulsion settle on a layout.  These layouts tend to 
approximate known community structure (Noack 2009).   
The nodes are sized relative to their betweenness centrality.  The colors represent 
the different communities.  Colors differ between communities, but the color of a 
community is not consistent throughout the evolution of the network (i.e. C02 may be 
blue in 1950 but yellow in 1960).  The nodes are labeled using a shortened name that can 
be referenced in Appendix A.  Nodes with names such as Agree47, Const5, Conve62, etc. 
are agreements, while United_Sta, Luxembourg, Iran_Isla are states.  In the bottom left 
                                                          
6 Community developed graph visualization software found at http://gephi.org. 
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of each diagram there is a smaller diagram showing the different communities in the 
network at that time.  The community nodes are sized by the size of the community and 
links between communities are sized by the number of shared links between the 
communities. 
If the GSEG behaves like the agent based models discussed in Chapter 2 
(Schelling 1978; Axelrod 1995; Macy et al. 2003) then the initial arrangement of 
agreements is critical to the future structure of the system.  At first countries act and 
cooperate freely and as they do so they sign new regulations and develop norms and 
practices.  These norms and practices can preclude the signing of future international 
policy thus restricting the freedom of future behavior of state actors (Grewal 2008).  As 
new agreements enter the system they tend to reproduce those earlier defined 
boundaries. 
The graph in 1950, Figure 4.6, represents the network at the beginning of the 
sample period.  The first agreement in the dataset (and the only agreement from the 19th 
century) was Revis1, Revised Convention on the Navigation of the Rhine, which can be seen 
as a small node on the far right of the network as part of C03.  The network begins tied 
together by five major agreements.  Agree46 and Agree47, the Agreement of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and Agreement of the International 
Monetary Fund  are key agreements throughout the life of the network, but only 
indirectly represent environmental concerns.  Three of the other top agreements tying 
the beginning of the system also concern international institutions and laws, Const3 
establishes UNESCO, Const5 establishes the WHO, and Chart2 is the charter of the UN. 
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These agreements establish protocols and norms the vast majority of state participants 
use. 
 In addition to the major central agreements, many agreements establish 
community structure by maintaining well-defined boundaries to participation.  The 
agreement Chart1 for instance establishes the Organization of American States and sits 
at the center of C02 for its entire lifespan, establishing protocol and norms for 
predominately South and Central America.   Community C03, predominately European 
nations, also has a number of agreements internal to the community.  These two 
communities and their internal agreements are responsible for the majority of the 









In 1960, Figure 4.7, the community C12 (green) emerges as many African 
countries sign UNESCO (Const3) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (Agree46).  Community C12 continues through the rest of the sample period 
and hosts many Southern or economically marginal states.  Central Asian, East Asian, 
and South American, and South Pacific nations also join Africa at different time points.  
Two tiny communities appear in this time point, C11 and C9.  Community C11 consists 
of one agreement and one country, the Dominican Republic and Inter18 (International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea).  In future time points other countries in the 
Caribbean sign Inter18 and Dominican Republic is absorbed into C17 with other 
Caribbean countries, which is later absorbed into C02 with other American nations (as 
shown in Figure 4.4). 
The Pacific Community (or one form of it) appears in this time point as C05 
(pink/purple).  It consists of Japan, Australia, United States, New Zealand and at this 
time Canada.  This community emerges again as communities C16, C22, and C23 at 
different time points but is occasionally very different from past forms and is assigned a 
new community number.  These nations follow two sets of rules.  Since all of these 
countries are advanced and English-speaking they tend to participate in UN centric and 
many Euro-centric global agreements.  Their position on the globe requires them to 
follow another set of rules governing the Pacific Ocean, such as whaling and shipping 
regulation.  New countries, new signatures, and new agreements tug these countries in 









By 1970 community C12 had grown significantly.  Modularity peaked in 1965 at 
Q=0.339 spurred by centripetal behavior on the part of the existing communities 
including C12 and C02.  Agree22, Agreement establishing the African Development Bank, 
and Afric0, African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources were 
both signed by African countries providing a center of the community and increasing 
the overall modularity of the network.  The large global agreements discussed before as 
well as a two new agreements regulating the nuclear armament and testing are members 
of C12 because they are more likely to be signed by countries in C12 than any other 
country.  These agreements have very high betweenness centrality because they sit on 
many paths between the many countries in C12 and the rest of the GSEG.  Because 
European countries in C03 sign these C12 agreements as well as the multitude of 
European agreements the agreements in C12 and the countries in C03 have high 
betweenness.  This structure is prototyped in Figure 3.4.b. where a country acts as a 
bridge between the communities by signing an agreement in a foreign module. 
Community C05 reappears as community C16 again in 1970.  Inter31, 
International Plant Protection Convention, was signed in the 1960’s which every member of 
C16 signed, in addition to a new amendment to the South Pacific Commission which 
further reinforced the community structure.  Repeated cooperation continues to 
reinforce norms and practices making it more likely for new agreements to follow the 
same patterns.  Community C17 and consists of Caribbean island nations and lives for 
12 years from 1968 and 1980.  Caribbean countries are anchored by Agree24, the 
establishment of the Caribbean Development Bank. 
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Figure 4.9 shows the GSEG in 1980.  By this point in the development of the 
GSEG almost all state actors that will participate, have joined the network.  The structure 
has begun to ossify (Depledge 2006) and the community structure has begun to settle on 
a stable configuration (Axelrod 1995; Macy et al. 2003).  Many of the rules norms and 
practices have been settled and new agreements continue to reinforce existing structure.   
There are only four communities represented at this time point.  Community C12 
has grown and C17, most Caribbean nations, has merged into it.  Community C03 has 
continued to reinforce itself adding new agreements internally while still signing many 
agreements within C12.  Community C02, with the Amazon and Central American 
rainforests, has continued to focus on biological diversity and the development of 
agricultural resources.  While many marginal states jump at any chance for participation 
in the global arena (Roberts and Parks 2007) C18 contains many countries which seem to 
participate only out of sheer necessity.  Iran, Belarus, Israel, and Egypt are all members 
of C18, and many of these countries were also part of C10 in previous diagrams.  The 
signing behavior of all these countries is similar so they tend to cluster together, but they 
are spread over a vast and varied geographical area (as seen in Figure 4.5) and maintain 
many conflicting political positions.  Many of the agreements they sign regard the safe 
containment of toxic or nuclear waste, or the use of land mines and other weapons.  This 
community never develops a distinct core of agreements as the other three in this time 
period have done, which leaves the boundaries of this community very unstable.   
Russia had been a member of C10, but joined Europe by 1980 by cooperating 
with Nordic countries such as Finland (also a former member of C10).  Saavedra et al. 
(2008) had created a model which managed to create modularity in two-mode networks 
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such as the GSEG based on rules of specialization and interaction.  Specialization 
defined how many partner (or in this case, agreements) a node will connect to.  
Interaction determines which partners (agreements) the node will interact with.  Russia’s 
split from C10 (which includes many Russian political allies) could be interpreted as a 
change in the interaction rules for Russia guiding participation within the network.  
Russia maintained an important seaport out of St. Petersburg, for instance, and it 
became necessary to develop strong relationships with countries such as Finland, 
Sweden, and other nations along the water ways.  It was clear there were many 
environmental concerns in Northwestern Russia and the surround waterways.  
European agencies set up institutions to help with funding, establish norms and rules, 
which eventually lead to tenuous but trusting relationships between the neighboring 
countries (Tennberg 2007).  From this point on, Russia maintains strong environmental 
relationships with the rest of Europe.  Successful cooperation between Russia and 
Europe reduces uncertainty that Russia (or Europe) cooperate rather than defect or free-









 Figures 4.10 and 4.11 show the GSEG in 1990 and 2000.  The three familiar 
communities from 1960 are still present (C02, C03 and C12), and the Pacific community 
has emerged again.  The betweenness of the C03 countries has grown since they have 
signed many new C03-internal agreements in the 1980’s.   By this point in the evolution 
of the GSEG, the structure has become nearly static.  New state actors are very rare at 
this point, but the network continues to grow as more agreements continue to be signed.  
Many classic divisions are present in these diagrams.  The North / South divide is clear 
in the connections between communities C12 and C03 (Roberts and Parks 2007), which 
East / West divides are seen between C03 and C18 (which contains Bulgaria, 
Yugoslavia, Romania, etc.).   
Community C02 continues to be genuinely concerned with the maintenance of 
biological diversity, the establishment of national parks, and the maintenance of water 
ways and agricultural land.  Institutional structures set up in the 1950’s and 1960’s 
continue to assist in conflict resolution, funding, and enforcement of agreed regulations.  
Many global and location agreements are part of C02 showing how environmental 
concern starts at a local level within the community and branches out to affect the policy 
on an global scale (Steinberg 2003). 
 The largest and most central agreements within the system are all related to the 
United Nations.  This indicates the central role which the United Nations plays in 
coordinating environmental regulations and norms (Meyer et al. 1997).  But while these 
agreements serve to offer some centralization, most of the agreements in the system exist 
within communities, rather than between them. 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 During last half of the 20th century the global system of environmental 
governance experienced a burst of growth.  This research applied a bipartite network 
analysis to quantify and map the evolution the system.  We discovered a complex 
arrangement of countries and environmental agreements consistent with descriptions 
provided by regime theory. Regimes are frameworks of explicit norms, rules, and 
procedures through which international cooperation is possible (Depledge, 2006; 
Krasner, 1982).  These frameworks ease uncertainty, and build trust and norms of 
reciprocity that minimize defection (Denemark and Hoffman, 2008).  Depledge (2006) 
argued regimes can breed ossification, with new international legislation functioning to 
reinforce past divisions and boundaries. 
 The complexity of the environmental system is what leads to ossification. 
Coordinating the behavior of 160+ participants is costly and fraught with challenges 
(Depledge, 2006). Reducing the number of participants may ease negotiation costs, but 
also imposes boundary rules on association.  The regime structures effectively removed 
much of the uncertainty associated with resource games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
in the multi-party negotiations, increased trust and reduced free-riding.  Agreements 
and institutions founded within boundaries of the communities facilitate future within-
boundary cooperation.  Our analysis shows evidence of community ossification.  
Following a chaotic configuration between 1950 and 1980 the structure of the GSEG was 
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stable from 1980 through 2000.  While new agreements and actors were continually 
added to the network, the modularity stabilized and many communities remained static.  
The movement of states in and out of C03 was very rare. 
 Complexity is a considerable driving force of the structure of the GSEG.  
Mathematical dynamical systems suggest how complex systems can behave and evolve 
over time.  Dynamical systems often exhibit attractors, locations in space to which actors 
move or orbit (Cîndea, 2006).  Gradual changes in the parameters of a system can lead to 
bifurcations or dramatic changes in the location or existence of attractors.  In the GSEG, 
IEAs function to anchor communities, facilitating future negotiations and bargaining 
relationships among nations.  
The GSEG, like both Axelrod’s and Macy et al.’s agent-based models of 
cooperation and organization, is very sensitive to initial conditions.  The first few 
agreements to be signed with a group of countries tend to define the boundaries of 
observed communities.  This is the case for the small set of biological diversity 
agreements in C03 in 1950, or the Organization of American States for C02, or the 
UNESCO agreement for C12.  Geography forms the initial conditions for many 
agreements.  Community C18 takes shape based on agreements regulating the use of the 
Danube and Black Sea.  But later agreements intrinsic to C18 have no basis in geography 
(such as the International Convention for Safe Containers), but these agreements have 
boundaries largely defined by past geographic agreements. 
Krasner (1982) suggests regimes are weakened if rules and norms become less 
coherent or cultures of practice become inconsistent.  Complexity interprets the 
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condition of regime weakening by suggesting the actors’ rules for interaction have 
changed, involving the movement of the location of attractors in the system.  Saavedra et 
al.’s (2008) model for cooperation in bipartite networks attempts a mechanistic 
explanation of the emergence of community structure, specifying the two mechanisms of 
specialization and interaction that lead to the emergence of community structure in 
bipartite networks.  Shifts in rules guiding specialization (or the number of agreements a 
country interacts with) and interaction (or the type agreements a country interacts with) 
for both node sets alter community structure.  Countries shift which agreements they 
sign as well as how many they are able to sign.  One clear shift in the interaction was the 
change in behavior that led to Russia moving from C10 to the European community C03.  
It became evident that many of Northwestern Russia’s environmental problems required 
some level of coordination with nearby Europe.  Rules for specialization, especially 
changed throughout, evidenced by Figure 4.2.  The number of countries invited to sign 
agreements increased in the early 1970’s to accommodate a growing global arena 
following the de-colonization.  But the size reduced to a 1950’s level by 1990 meaning 
during the intervening period agreements were more localized to regions or specific 
needs, thus increasing modularity and reinforcing the community structure. 
IEAs initially involving a small group of countries routinely open up to the 
larger community of nations. Hoffman (2006) applies this notion of incremental 
expansion to the ozone depletion regime.  He explains how legislation was initially 
geared as North-only.  Following the Montreal Protocol it was realized that ozone-
harming industries could develop in the Global South.  The United States called for 
universal participation, thus changing the participation rules for the ozone depletion 
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regime.  Regime theory, Hoffman argues, generally overlooks these dynamics.  
Conversely, participation rules can be narrowly defined, such as in the whaling regime.  
A few nations (such as Japan, United States and New Zealand) account for the vast 
majority of whaling, thus the successful whaling legislation demands their inclusion. 
In our study, other examples of participation shifts were discovered.  
Community C18, which consisted of Eastern Europe, Western Asia and a scattering of 
other nations, broke apart as the rule for Eastern European participation in European 
environmental regimes changed following the collapse of the Soviet Union.  The early 
Pacific community (C05) merged with C10, a community focused largely on the 
regulation of water in 1965 as countries found it necessary to sign the same agreements.  
The rules for Caribbean island nations (C17) initially defined their environmental 
problems as Caribbean-only, but these rules shifted and C17 merged with South / 
Central America (C02).   
A long-since signed agreement that defines a community could be signed later 
by a number of countries in a different community, slowly shifting the landscape 
position of that agreement and the prior signatories.  Many of the very short-lived 
communities (1- 2 years, not shown) emerge for this reason.  An agreement or set of 
agreements is initially signed by a small group, spawning a new community, but in the 
next year, many other countries from the larger community of nations sign the 
agreement as well, merging the agreement back into the larger community. 
Differing from case or small n studies of agreement behavior or research that 
aggregates global level behavior, our approach of bipartite network analysis and 
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modularity provides insights at the meso-scale.  Regimes are usefully defined as meso-
scale structures, consisting of more than one state actor and typically covering only a 
part of the international system.  The analytic approach of our paper also differs from 
other studies on agreement networks (Hoffman et al., 2007) by maintaining the bipartite 
structure of the network throughout the analysis.  This approach allows a simultaneous 
examination of both the countries and the agreements they sign.  We can define the 
geographic or political boundaries of communities and also consider which agreements 
define them.  As expected, the role of agreements is considerably different than that of 
countries. Agreements are more likely to either further ossify communities or unite them 
on a global scale.  There are no countries which have taken to signing agreements in a 
wide variety of communities that, in effect, unite the system.  Our analysis also extends 
modularity analysis (Palla et al., 2007) with longitudinal assessment of changes in 
community boundaries.  We tracked modularity over time and were able to measure 
changes in polarization.   
 Improvements could be made to algorithms used in this research. Randomness 
in the BRIM algorithm could be harnessed to identify community overlap.  Also, 
communities were established first, and the connections from each time point were 
identified second.  The integration of the two algorithms could improve performance 
and accuracy (such as seeding the community sets using the communities from a 
previous time point rather than randomly).  This research is at a meso-scale and the 
effects of network position on state behavior are not explicitly explored (such as the role 
of centrality and the risk of ratifying agreements). 
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 In this work we examined the evolution of community structure in the global 
system of environmental governance from 1950-2000.  The methodology used opens up 
a number of existing networks for similar analysis, as in economic or security 
agreements signed between nations.  By maintaining the duality of countries and 
agreements the roles of both classes can be studied in tandem.  The formation, stability, 
and dynamics of the discovered community structure are consistent with regime theory 
and complexity science models.  Network science concepts and techniques will be 
increasingly important to developing and empirically testing theory and mechanisms 
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APPENDIX I: LIST OF ACTORS 
Code Full Name Type 
ASEAN0 ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources Agreement 
Addit3 
Additional Protocol to the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear 
Energy Agreement 
Addit4 
Additional Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Animals during 
International Transport Agreement 
Addit5 Additional Protokoll No 4 to the Revised Convention on Navigation on the Rhine Agreement 
Afric0 African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources Agreement 
Agre0 
(Agreement on the Protection of Confidentiality of Data related to Deep Sea-bed Areas 
for which application of Authorisation has been made) Agreement 
Agree1 Agreement Establishing the South Pacific Commission Agreement 
Agree2 Agreement Extending the Territorial Scope of the South Pacific Commission Agreement 
Agree3 Agreement amending the Agreement Establishing the South Pacific Commission Agreement 
Agree4 
Agreement between the Central African States concerning the Creation of a Special Fund 
for the Conservation of Wild Wild Fauna Agreement 
Agree7 
Agreement concerning Cooperation in taking Measures against Pollution of the Sea by 
Oil Agreement 
Agree9 
Agreement concerning Interim Arrangements relating to Polymetallic Nodules of the 
Deep Sea Bed Agreement 
Agree10 
Agreement concerning Measures for the Protection of the Stocks of Deep Sea Prawns 
(Pandalus Borealis) Lobsters (Homarus Vulgaris) (Nephrops Norvegicus) and Crabs 
(Cancer Pagurus) Agreement 
Agree11 
Agreement concerning the Adoption of Uniform Conditions of Approval and Reciprocal 
Recognition of Approval for Motor Vehicle Equipment and Parts Agreement 
Agree12 
Agreement concerning the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine 
against Pollution Agreement 
Agree13 Agreement concerning the Protection of Water of the Mediterranean Shores Agreement 
Agree14 
Agreement concerning the Regulations of Lake Inari by means of the Kaitakoski Hydro - 
electric Power Station and Dam Agreement 
Agree16 
Agreement concerning the Voluntary Contributions to be given for the Execution of the 
Project to preserve Borobudur Agreement 
Agree17 
Agreement concerning the Voluntary Contributions to be given for the Execution of the 
Project to save the Temples of Philae Agreement 
Agree19 
Agreement concerning the voluntary contributions to be given for the execution of the 
project to save the Abu Simbel Temples Agreement 
Agree20 
Agreement constituting the National Commission for the Development of the Riverbed 
Rio Pilcomayo Agreement 
Agree22 Agreement establishing the African Development Bank Agreement 
Agree23 Agreement establishing the Asian Development Bank Agreement 
Agree24 Agreement establishing the Caribbean Development Bank Agreement 




Agreement establishing the Fund for the Development of the Indigenous Peoples of 
Latin America and the Caribbean Agreement 
Agree27 Agreement establishing the Inter-American Development Bank Agreement 
Agree28 Agreement establishing the South Pacific Regional Environment Programme Agreement 
Agree30 
Agreement for Cooperation and Consultation between the Central African States for the 
Conservation of Wild Fauna Agreement 
Agree31 
Agreement for Cooperation in Dealing with Pollution of the North Sea by Oil and other 
Harmful Substances Agreement 
Agree35 
Agreement for the Establishment of Southern African Centre for Ivory Marketing 
(SACIM) Agreement 
Agree42 Agreement for the Establishment of the Near East Plant Protection Organization Agreement 
Agree43 
Agreement for the Establishment of the Network of Aquaculture Centres in Asia and the 
Pacific Agreement 
Agree44 
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement 
Agree45 Agreement governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies Agreement 
Agree46 Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Agreement 
Agree47 Agreement of the International Monetary Fund Agreement 
Agree49 
Agreement on Co-operative Enforcement Operations directed at Illegal Trade in Wild 
Fauna and Flora Agreement 
Agree51 Agreement on Conservation of Polar Bears Agreement 
Agree52 Agreement on Reciprocal Access to Fishing in the Skagerrak and the Kattegat Agreement 
Agree53 
Agreement on Regional Co-operation in Combating Pollution of the South-East Pacific by 
Hydrocarbons or other Harmful Substances in cases of Emergency Agreement 
Agree55 
Agreement on the Action Plan for the Environmentally Sound Management of the 
Common Zambezi River System Agreement 
Agree56 Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds Agreement 
Agree57 Agreement on the Conservation of Bats in Europe Agreement 
Agree58 Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans of the Black Sea Agreement 
Agree59 Agreement on the Conservation of Seals in the Wadden Sea Agreement 
Agree60 Agreement on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic and North Seas Agreement 
Agree61 
Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River 
Basin Agreement 
Agree62 Agreement on the European Economic Area Agreement 
Agree63 
Agreement on the Exploitation and Conservation of the Maritime Resources of the South 
Pacific Agreement 
Agree64 Agreement on the Joint Regulations on Fauna and Flora Agreement 
Agree65 Agreement on the Organisation for Indian Ocean Marine Affairs (IOMAC) Agreement 
Agree66 
Agreement on the Preparation of a Tripartite Environmental Management Programme 
for Lake Victoria Agreement 
Agree67 
Agreement on the Preservation of the Confidentiality of Data concerning Deep Seabed 
Areas Agreement 
Agree69 Agreement on the Protection of the Salmon in the Baltic Sea Agreement 
Agree70 
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts Astronauts and the Return of Objects launched 
into Outer Space Agreement 
Agree71 





Agreement on transboundary cooperation with a view to preventing or limiting harmfull 
effects for human beings property or the environment in the event of accidents Agreement 
Agree73 Agreement regarding Monitoring of the Stratosphere Agreement 
Agree74 
Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Agreement 
Agree75 Agreement to Establish the South Centre Agreement 
Amend4 Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer Agreement 
Amend7 Amendment to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America Agreement 
Amend8 Amendment to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America Agreement 
Amend1 Amendment of the Plant Protection Agreement for the Asia and Pacific Region Agreement 
Amend13 
Amendments to the Annexes to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution 
by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter Agreement 
Amend15 
Amendments to the Convention for the Regulation of the Meshes of Fishing Nets and 
the Size Limits of Fish Agreement 
Artic1 Articles of Association for the establishment of an Economic Community of West Africa Agreement 
Artic2 Articles of Association of the South Asia Co-operative Environment Programme Agreement 
Benel0 Benelux Convention on Nature Conservation and Landscape Protection Agreement 
Chart1 Charter of the Organization of American States Agreement 
Chart2 Charter of the United Nations Agreement 
Compr0 Comprehensive Nuclear Test - Ban Treaty Agreement 
Const3 Constitution of the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization Agreement 
Const4 Constitution of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization Agreement 
Const5 Constitution of the World Health Organization Agreement 
Conve1 Convention Creating the Niger Basin Authority Agreement 
Conve3 Convention Establishing the Latin American Economic System ( SELA ) Agreement 
Conve4 Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material Agreement 
Conve5 
Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29th July 1960 on Third Party 
Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy as amended in 1964 and 1982 Agreement 
Conve6 Convention and Statute on the Regime of Navigable Waterways of International Concern Agreement 
Conve8 Convention concerning Fishing in the Black Sea Agreement 
Conve9 Convention concerning Fishing in the Waters of the Danube Agreement 
Conve11 Convention concerning Navigation on Lake Constance Agreement 
Conve15 Convention concerning the Protection of Alps Agreement 
Conve22 
Convention establishing a marine scientific organization for the North Pacific Region ( 
PICES ) Agreement 
Conve23 
Convention for Co-operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine and 
Coastal Environment of the West and Central African Region Agreement 
Conve24 Convention for the Conservation of Anadromous Stocks Agreement 
Conve25 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals Agreement 
Conve27 Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna Agreement 
Conve28 
Convention for the Conservation of the Biodiversity and the Protection of Wilderness 




Convention for the Establishment of the European and Mediterranean Plant Protection 
Organisation Agreement 
Conve31 Convention for the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea Agreement 
Conve32 Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific Agreement 
Conve33 
Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the 
Wider Caribbean Region Agreement 
Conve34 Convention for the Protection of Birds Useful to Agriculture Agreement 
Conve35 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Agreement 
Conve36 
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and Coastal Area of the South-
East Pacific Agreement 
Conve37 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic Agreement 
Conve38 
Convention for the Protection of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Eastern 
African Region Agreement 
Conve39 Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution Agreement 
Conve40 
Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South 
Pacific Region ( SPREP Convention) Agreement 
Conve41 Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer Agreement 
Conve42 Convention for the Protection of the Rhine against Chemical Pollution Agreement 
Conve43 
Convention for the Protection of the Rhine from Pollution by Chlorides modified by 
Exchanges of letters Agreement 
Conve46 Convention of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Agreement 
Conve47 Convention of the World Meteorological Organization Agreement 
Conve48 
Convention on Access to Information Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access 
to Justice in Environmental Matters Agreement 
Conve49 Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency Agreement 
Conve50 Convention on Biological Diversity Agreement 
Conve51 Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Agreement 
Conve52 
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage resulting from Exploration for and 
Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources Agreement 
Conve53 Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships Agreement 
Conve54 Convention on Conduct of Fishing Operations in the North Atlantic Agreement 
Conve55 Convention on Conservation of Nature in the South Pacific Agreement 
Conve56 Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube River Agreement 
Conve57 Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident Agreement 
Conve58 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context Agreement 
Conve60 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas Agreement 
Conve61 
Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries ( 
NAFO ) Agreement 
Conve62 Convention on International Civil Aviation Annex 16 - Aircraft Noise Agreement 
Conve63 Convention on International Liability for Damage caused by Space Objects Agreement 
Conve64 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora Agreement 
Conve66 Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims Agreement 
Conve67 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Agreement 
Conve68 Convention on Nature Protection and Wild Life Preservation in the Western Hemisphere Agreement 
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Conve69 Convention on Nuclear Safety Agreement 
Conve70 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space Agreement 
Conve71 Convention on Road Traffic Agreement 
Conve72 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage Agreement 
Conve73 Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy Agreement 
Conve74 Convention on Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents Agreement 
Conve75 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat Agreement 
Conve76 
Convention on civil liability for damage resulting from activities dangerous to the 
environment Agreement 
Conve77 Convention on fisheries cooperation among African States bordering the Atlantic Ocean Agreement 
Conve78 Convention on multilateral cooperation in North-East Atlantic fisheries Agreement 
Conve80 
Convention on the Ban of the Import of Hazardous Wastes into Africa and on the Control 
of their Transboundary Movements within Africa Agreement 
Conve82 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources Agreement 
Conve83 Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats Agreement 
Conve84 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals Agreement 
Conve85 Convention on the Continental Shelf Agreement 
Conve86 
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their 
Disposal Agreement 
Conve89 Convention on the High Seas Agreement 
Conve90 Convention on the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences Agreement 
Conve91 Convention on the International Commission for the Protection of the Oder Agreement 
Conve92 Convention on the International Maritime Organization Agreement 
Conve93 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea Agreement 
Conve94 
Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or 
between International Organizations Agreement 
Conve95 Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses Agreement 
Conve96 Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships Agreement 
Conve98 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Agreement 
Conve99 
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other 
Matter Agreement 
Conve100 
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques Agreement 
Conve101 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological ( Biological ) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction Agreement 
Conve102 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development Production and their Destruction Agreement 
Conve103 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel 
Mines and on their Destruction Agreement 
Conve104 
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International 
Lakes Agreement 
Conve105 
Convention on the Protection of the Archeological Historical and Artistic Heritage of the 
American Nations (Convention of Salvador) Agreement 
Conve106 Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea against Pollution Agreement 
Conve107 Convention on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law Agreement 
Conve108 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area Agreement 
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Conve109 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area Agreement 
Conve110 Convention on the Protection of the Rhine Agreement 
Conve111 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Agreement 
Conve112 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone Agreement 
Conve113 Convention on the international commission for the protection of the Elbe Agreement 
Conve115 Convention regulating the Withdrawal of Water from Lake Constance Agreement 
Conve116 
Convention relative ` la collecte riception des dichets survenant en navigation rhenaneet 
intirieure Agreement 
Conve117 Convention relative aux transports internationaux ferroviaires ( COTIF ) Agreement 
Conve118 Convention relative to the Preservation of Fauna and Flora in their Natural State Agreement 
Conve121 
Convention to ban the Importation into Forum Island Countries of Hazardous Wastes 
and Radioactive Wastes and to control the Transboundary Movement and Management 
of Hazardous Wastes within the South Pacific Agreement 
Coope0 
Cooperation Agreement for the Protection of the coasts and waters of the North-East 
Atlantic against Pollution Agreement 
Easte0 Eastern Pacific Ocean Tuna Fishing Agreement Agreement 
Energ0 Energy Charter Protocol on Energy Efficiency and related Environmental Aspects Agreement 
Energ1 Energy Charter Treaty Agreement 
Europ0 
European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road 
( ADR ) Agreement 
Europ1 
European Agreement on the Restriction of the Use of certain Detergents in Washing and 
Cleaning Products Agreement 
Europ2 European Convention for the Protection of Animals during International Transport Agreement 
Europ3 European Convention for the Protection of Pet Animals Agreement 
Europ4 
European Convention for the Protection of Vertebrate Animals used for Experimental 
and other Scientific Purposes Agreement 
Europ5 European Convention on Establishment Agreement 
Europ6 European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage Agreement 
Europ7 European Cultural Convention Agreement 
Europ8 
European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial 
Communities or Authorities Agreement 
Europ9 European Social Charter Agreement 
Fishe0 Fisheries Convention Agreement 
Fourt0 Fourth ACP-EEC Convention Agreement 
Frame0 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities Agreement 
Inter0 Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles Agreement 
Inter1 
International Agreement for the Creation of an International Office for dealing with 
Contagious Diseases of Animals at Paris Agreement 
Inter2 International Convenant on Economic Cultural Rights Agreement 
Inter3 International Convention for Safe Containers (CSS) Agreement 
Inter4 International Convention for the Campaign against Contagious Diseases of Animals Agreement 
Inter5 International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas Agreement 
Inter6 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships ( MARPOL ) Agreement 
Inter10 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships as modified by the 
Protocol of 1978 Agreement 




International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (consolidated 
version) Agreement 
Inter14 
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants as amended on 
23.10.1978 Agreement 
Inter15 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of plants Agreement 
Inter16 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling Agreement 
Inter17 International Convention for the Safety of Fishing Vessels Agreement 
Inter18 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea Agreement 
Inter19 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea ( SOLAS ) Agreement 
Inter21 
International Convention on Certain Rules concerning Civil Jurisdiction in Matters of 
Collision Agreement 
Inter22 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Agreement 
Inter23 
International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with 
the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea Agreement 
Inter24 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness Response and Co-operation Agreement 
Inter25 International Convention on Salvage Agreement 
Inter26 
International Convention on Standards of Training Certification and Watchkeeping for 
Seafarers Agreement 
Inter27 
International Convention relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil 
Pollution Casualties Agreement 
Inter28 
International Convention relating to the Limitation of the Liability of Owners of Sea-
going Ships Agreement 
Inter29 
International Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing 
Serious Drought and or Desertification Agreement 
Inter30 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Agreement 
Inter31 International Plant Protection Convention Agreement 
Inter34 International Tropical Timber Agreement Agreement 
Inter35 International Tropical Timber Agreement Agreement 
Joint0 
Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of 
Radioactive Waste Management Agreement 
Joint1 
Joint Protocol relating to the application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris 
Convention Agreement 
Kuwai0 
Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine 
Environment from Pollution Agreement 
Kyoto0 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Agreement 
Nordi0 Nordic Environmental Protection Convention Agreement 
Nordi1 Nordic Mutual Emergency Assistance Agreement in connection with Radiation Accidents Agreement 
North0 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation Agreement 
North1 North American Free Trade Agreement ( NAFTA ) Agreement 
North2 North Atlantic Treaty Agreement 
North3 North-East Atlantic Fisheries Convention Agreement 
Optio0 Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes Agreement 
Optio1 Optional Protocol of Signature concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes Agreement 
Plant0 Plant Protection Agreement for the Asia and Pacific Region Agreement 
Proto0 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the 




Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) Agreement 
Proto2 Protocol Agreement on the Conservation of Common Natural Resources Agreement 
Proto3 
Protocol Concerning Regional Co-operation in Combating Pollution by Oil and other 
Harmful Substances in Cases of Emergency Agreement 
Proto4 
Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Biological Diversity in the 
Mediterranean Agreement 
Proto5 
Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife to the Convention for the 
Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region Agreement 
Proto6 
Protocol I to the Convention for the the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the 
South Pacific Agreement 
Proto7 
Protocol II to the Convention for the the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the 
South Pacific Agreement 
Proto8 
Protocol Relating to Modification of the International Convention for the Conservation of 
Atlantic Tunas Agreement 
Proto9 
Protocol additionnal to the Convention for the Protection of the Rhine from Pollution by 
Chlorides Agreement 
Proto11 
Protocol amending the Agreement concerning Measures for the Protection of the Stocks 
of Deep Sea Prawns (Pandalus Borealis) Norway Lobsters(Nephrops Norvegicus) and 
Crabs (Cancer Pagurus) Agreement 
Proto12 Protocol amending the Agreement on the Protection of the Salmon in the Baltic Sea Agreement 
Proto13 
Protocol amending the Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping 
from Ships and Aircraft Agreement 
Proto14 
Protocol amending the Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping 
from Ships and Aircraft Agreement 
Proto15 
Protocol amending the Convention for the prevention of marine pollution from land-
based sources Agreement 
Proto18 
Protocol amending the European Agreement on the Restriction of the Use of certain 
Detergents in Washing and Cleaning Products Agreement 
Proto19 
Protocol amending the International Convention Relating to the Limitation of the 
Liability of Owners of Sea-going Ships Agreement 
Proto22 
Protocol concerning Co-operation in Combating Marine Pollution in cases of Emergency 
in the Eastern African Region Agreement 
Proto23 Protocol concerning Co-operation in Combating Oil Spills in the Wider Caribbean Region Agreement 
Proto24 
Protocol concerning Co-operation in Combating Pollution Emergencies in the South 
Pacific Region Agreement 
Proto25 
Protocol concerning Co-operation in Combating Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by 
Oil and other Harmful Substances in Cases of Emergency Agreement 
Proto26 Protocol concerning Co-operation in combating Pollution in cases of Emergency Agreement 
Proto27 
Protocol concerning Marine Pollution resulting from Exploration and Exploitation of the 
Continental Shelf Agreement 
Proto28 Protocol concerning Mediterranean Specially Protected Areas Agreement 
Proto29 
Protocol concerning Protected Areas and Wild Fauna and Flora in the Eastern African 
Region Agreement 
Proto30 
Protocol concerning Regional Co-operation in Combating Pollution by Oil and other 
Harmful Substances in Cases of Emergency Agreement 
Proto32 
Protocol for the Conservation and Management of Protected Marine and Coastal Areas 
of the South-East Pacific Agreement 
Proto33 
Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Dumping from 
Ships and Aircraft Agreement 




Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating Bacteriological Methods of 
Warfare Agreement 
Proto36 
Protocol for the Protection of South-East Pacific against Pollution from Land-Based 
Sources Agreement 
Proto37 
Protocol for the Protection of the Marine Environment against Pollution from Land-
Based Sources Agreement 
Proto38 
Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution from Land-Based 
Sources Agreement 
Proto39 Protocol for the Protection of the South-East Pacific against Radioactive Pollution Agreement 
Proto40 
Protocol for the implementation of the Alpine Convention in the field of mountain 
agriculture Agreement 
Proto41 
Protocol for the implementation of the Alpine Convention in the field of mountain 
forests Agreement 
Proto42 
Protocol for the implementation of the Alpine Convention in the field of nature 
protection and landscape conservation Agreement 
Proto43 
Protocol for the implementation of the Alpine Convention in the field of town and 
country planning and sustainable development Agreement 
Proto44 
Protocol for the protection of the Mediterranean Sea against pollution resulting from 
exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf and the seabed and its subsoil Agreement 
Proto45 Protocol of 1996 to amend the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims Agreement 
Proto46 Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer Agreement 
Proto47 
Protocol relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Pollution by Substances 
other than Oil Agreement 
Proto48 Protocol relating to the Development Fund of the Niger Basin Agreement 
Proto49 
Protocol relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea ( SOLAS 
Prot.) Agreement 
Proto50 
Protocol relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS 
PROT 1988) Agreement 
Proto51 
Protocol to Amend the Convention of 31st January 1963 Supplementary to the Paris 
Convention of 29th July 1960 on third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy as 
amended by the Additional protocol of 28th January 1964 Agreement 
Proto52 
Protocol to Amend the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy 
of 29th July 1960 amended by the Additional Protocol of 28th January 1964 Agreement 
Proto53 Protocol to Establish a Tripartite Standing Committee on Polluted Waters Agreement 
Proto54 
Protocol to amend Paragraph 2 of Article X of the International Convention for the 
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas Agreement 
Proto55 
Protocol to amend the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially 
as Waterfowl Habitat Agreement 
Proto56 
Protocol to amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage Agreement 
Proto58 
Protocol to amend the International Convention on the Establishment of an 
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage Agreement 
Proto60 Protocol to amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Agreement 
Proto61 
Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution concerning 
the Control of Emissions of Volatile Organic Compounds or their Transboundary Fluxes Agreement 
Proto62 
Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution on the 
Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least 30 per Cent Agreement 
Proto63 Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty on Environmental Protection Agreement 
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Proto64 Protocol to the Convention for the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea Agreement 
Proto65 
Protocol to the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution concerning the 
Control of Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or their Transboundary Fluxes Agreement 
Proto66 Protocol to the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on Heavy Metals Agreement 
Proto67 
Protocol to the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on Persistent 
Organic Pollutants Agreement 
Proto68 
Protocol to the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on further 
Reduction of Sulphur Emissions Agreement 
Proto69 
Protocol to the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution on Long-Term 
Financing of Co-operative Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long Range 
Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe ( EMEP ) Agreement 
Proto70 
Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes 
and Other Matter Agreement 
Proto71 Protocol to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling Agreement 
Proto72 Protocol to the International Convention for the Safety of Fishing Vessels Agreement 
Proto73 Protocol to the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Agreement 
Proto74 
Protocol to the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund 
of Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage Agreement 
Proto75 Protocol to the Treaty on Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon - Free Zone Agreement 
Proto76 
Protocole d' adhésion de la Principauté de Monaco à la Convention sur la protection des 
Alpes Agreement 
Proto77 Protocole d' application de la convention alpine de 1991 dans le domaine de l' energie Agreement 
Proto78 Protocole d' application de la convention alpine de 1991 dans le domaine du tourisme Agreement 
Proto79 
Protocole de l' application de la convention alpine de 1991dans le domaine de la 
protection des sols Agreement 
Provi0 Provisional Understanding Regarding Deep Seabed Matters Agreement 
Regio0 Regional Agreement on the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes Agreement 
Regio1 
Regional Convention for the Conservation of the Red Sea and of the Gulf of Aden 
Environment Agreement 
Regio2 
Regional Convention for the management and conservation of the natural forest 
ecosystems and the development of forest plantations Agreement 
Revis0 
Revised Convention for the Establishment of a European Organisation for Nuclear 
Research Agreement 
Revis1 Revised Convention on the Navigation of the Rhine Agreement 
Rotte0 
Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous 
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade Agreement 
Secon0 Second Protocol amending the Convention on the Canalization of the Mosel Agreement 
Singl0 Single European Act Agreement 
South0 South Pacific Fisheries Treaty Agreement 
South1 South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency Convention Agreement 
Statu1 Statute of the Council of Europe Agreement 
Statu4 Statutes of the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology Agreement 
Suppl0 
Supplementary Agreement to the 1963 Agreement on the International Commission for 
the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution Agreement 
Suppl1 
Supplementary Protocol of 26 March 1998 to the Convention concerning the Regime of 




Supplementary Protocol to the Agreement on Regional Co-operation in Combating 
Pollution of the South-East Pacific by Hydrocarbons or other Harmful Substances Agreement 
The_A0 The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty Agreement 
The_A1 The Antarctic Treaty Agreement 
The_S0 The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty Agreement 
Third0 Third ACP-EEC Convention Agreement 
Third1 Third Protocol amending the Convention on the canalization of the Mosel Agreement 
Treat0 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere Outer Space and under Water Agreement 
Treat1 Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Agreement 
Treat6 Treaty for Amazonian Co-operation Agreement 
Treat8 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America Agreement 
Treat9 Treaty of the Southern African Development Community Agreement 
Treat10 Treaty on European Union Agreement 
Treat11 
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space Moon and other Celestial Bodies Agreement 
Treat12 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Agreement 
Treat13 
Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons 
of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof Agreement 
Treat14 Treaty on the Rio de la Plata Rio de la Plata Vertrag Agreement 
Treat15 Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon - Free Zone Agreement 
Unite0 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Agreement 
Unite1 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Agreement 
Vienn0 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Agreement 
Afghanista Afghanistan Country 
Albania Albania Country 
Algeria Algeria Country 
Andorra Andorra Country 
Angola Angola Country 
Antigua_an Antigua and Barbuda Country 
Argentina Argentina Country 
Armenia Armenia Country 
Australia Australia Country 
Austria Austria Country 
Azerbaijan Azerbaijan Country 
Bahamas Bahamas Country 
Bahrain Bahrain Country 
Bangladesh Bangladesh Country 
Barbados Barbados Country 
Belarus Belarus Country 
Belgium Belgium Country 
Belize Belize Country 
Benin Benin Country 
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Bhutan Bhutan Country 
Bolivia Bolivia Country 
Bosnia_and Bosnia and Herzegovina Country 
Botswana Botswana Country 
Brazil Brazil Country 
Brunei_Dar Brunei Darussalam Country 
Bulgaria Bulgaria Country 
Burkina_Fa Burkina Faso Country 
Burundi Burundi Country 
CTte_dIvo CTte d'Ivoire Country 
Cambodia Cambodia Country 
Cameroon Cameroon Country 
Canada Canada Country 
Cape_Verde Cape Verde Country 
Central_Af Central African Republic Country 
Chad Chad Country 
Chile Chile Country 
China China Country 
Colombia Colombia Country 
Comoros Comoros Country 
Congo Congo Country 
Costa_Rica Costa Rica Country 
Croatia Croatia Country 
Cuba Cuba Country 
Cyprus Cyprus Country 
Czech_Repu Czech Republic Country 
Democratic Democratic People's Rep. of Korea Country 
Denmark Denmark Country 
Djibouti Djibouti Country 
Dominica Dominica Country 
Dominican Dominican Republic Country 
Ecuador Ecuador Country 
Egypt Egypt Country 
El_Salvado El Salvador Country 
Equatorial Equatorial Guinea Country 
Eritrea Eritrea Country 
Estonia Estonia Country 
Ethiopia Ethiopia Country 
Fiji Fiji Country 
Finland Finland Country 
France France Country 
Gabon Gabon Country 
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Gambia Gambia Country 
Georgia Georgia Country 
Germany Germany Country 
Ghana Ghana Country 
Greece Greece Country 
Grenada Grenada Country 
Guatemala Guatemala Country 
Guinea Guinea Country 
Guinea-Bis Guinea-Bissau Country 
Guyana Guyana Country 
Haiti Haiti Country 
Honduras Honduras Country 
Hungary Hungary Country 
Iceland Iceland Country 
India India Country 
Indonesia Indonesia Country 
Iran_Isla Iran (Islamic Republic of) Country 
Iraq Iraq Country 
Ireland Ireland Country 
Israel Israel Country 
Italy Italy Country 
Jamaica Jamaica Country 
Japan Japan Country 
Jordan Jordan Country 
Kazakhstan Kazakhstan Country 
Kenya Kenya Country 
Kiribati Kiribati Country 
Kuwait Kuwait Country 
Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan Country 
Lao_People Lao People's Democratic Rep. Country 
Latvia Latvia Country 
Lebanon Lebanon Country 
Lesotho Lesotho Country 
Liberia Liberia Country 
Libyan_Ara Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Country 
Liechtenst Liechtenstein Country 
Lithuania Lithuania Country 
Luxembourg Luxembourg Country 
Macedonia Macedonia (The former Yugoslav Republic of) Country 
Madagascar Madagascar Country 
Malawi Malawi Country 
Malaysia Malaysia Country 
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Maldives Maldives Country 
Mali Mali Country 
Malta Malta Country 
Marshall Marshall Islands Country 
Mauritania Mauritania Country 
Mauritius Mauritius Country 
Mexico Mexico Country 
Micronesia Micronesia (Federated States of) Country 
Moldova Moldova (Republic of) Country 
Monaco Monaco Country 
Mongolia Mongolia Country 
Morocco Morocco Country 
Mozambique Mozambique Country 
Myanmar Myanmar Country 
Namibia Namibia Country 
Nauru Nauru Country 
Nepal Nepal Country 
Netherland Netherlands Country 
New_Zealan New Zealand Country 
Nicaragua Nicaragua Country 
Niger Niger Country 
Nigeria Nigeria Country 
Norway Norway Country 
Oman Oman Country 
Pakistan Pakistan Country 
Palau Palau Country 
Panama Panama Country 
Papua_New Papua New Guinea Country 
Paraguay Paraguay Country 
Peru Peru Country 
Philippine Philippines Country 
Poland Poland Country 
Portugal Portugal Country 
Qatar Qatar Country 
Republic_o Republic of Korea Country 
Romania Romania Country 
Russian_Fe Russian Federation Country 
Rwanda Rwanda Country 
Sahrawi_De Sahrawi Democratic Arab Republic Country 
Saint_Kitt Saint Kitts and Nevis Country 
Saint_Luci Saint Lucia Country 
Saint_Vinc Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Country 
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Samoa Samoa Country 
San_Marino San Marino Country 
Sao_Tome_a Sao Tome and Principe Country 
Saudi_Arab Saudi Arabia Country 
Senegal Senegal Country 
Seychelles Seychelles Country 
Sierra_Leo Sierra Leone Country 
Singapore Singapore Country 
Slovakia Slovakia Country 
Slovenia Slovenia Country 
Solomon_Is Solomon Islands Country 
Somalia Somalia Country 
South_Afri South Africa Country 
Spain Spain Country 
Sri_Lanka Sri Lanka Country 
Sudan Sudan Country 
Suriname Suriname Country 
Swaziland Swaziland Country 
Sweden Sweden Country 
Switzerlan Switzerland Country 
Syrian_Ara Syrian Arab Republic Country 
Taiwan Taiwan Country 
Tajikistan Tajikistan Country 
Thailand Thailand Country 
Togo Togo Country 
Tonga Tonga Country 
Trinidad_a Trinidad and Tobago Country 
Tunisia Tunisia Country 
Turkey Turkey Country 
Turkmenist Turkmenistan Country 
Tuvalu Tuvalu Country 
Uganda Uganda Country 
Ukraine Ukraine Country 
United_Ara United Arab Emirates Country 
United_Kin United Kingdom Country 
United_Rep United Republic of Tanzania Country 
United_Sta United States Country 
Uruguay Uruguay Country 
Uzbekistan Uzbekistan Country 
Vanuatu Vanuatu Country 
Venezuela Venezuela Country 
Viet_Nam Viet Nam Country 
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Yemen Yemen Country 
Yugoslavia Yugoslavia Country 
Zaire Zaire Country 
Zambia Zambia Country 






















































































































































































































ASEAN0 12 18 2 2 2 2 2 18 18 2 12 25 12 12 12 12
Addit3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Addit4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Addit5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Afric0 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Agre0 3 3 3 22 22 22 22 22 2 3 23 23 25 23 23 23 23
Agree1 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 15 1 16 16 16 16 16 16 2 19 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 22 22 22 22 3 2 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Agree2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 15 1 16 16 16 16 16 16 2 19 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 22 22 22 22 18 2 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Agree3 5 1 15 1 16 16 16 16 16 16 2 19 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 22 22 22 22 18 2 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Agree4 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Agree7 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Agree9 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Agree10 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Agree11 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Agree12 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Agree13 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 24 24 3 3
Agree14 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 18 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Agree16 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Agree17 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Agree19 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Agree20 2 2 2 2 2 2
Agree22 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Agree23 1 15 1 16 16 16 16 16 16 12 19 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 2 12 22 22 22 22 22 18 18 23 23 25 23 23 23 23
Agree24 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Agree25 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Agree26 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Agree27 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Agree28 12 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Agree30 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Agree31 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Agree35 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Agree42 18 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Agree43 2 2 2 2 18 18 2 12 2 12 12 12 2
Agree44 23 23 23 23 23 23
Agree45 18 2 18 2 18 2 18 2 2 2 2 2 2 18 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Agree46 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Agree47 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Agree49 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Agree51 16 2 19 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 23 23 3 3 3 3 3
Agree52 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Agree53 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Agree55 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Agree56 3 3 3 3 3
Agree57 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Agree58 24 24 24 3 3
Agree59 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Agree60 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Agree61 12 25 12 12 12 12
Agree62 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Agree63 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Agree64 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Agree65 2 2 18 18 2 12 2 12 12 12 2
Agree66 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Agree67 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Agree69 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Agree70 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 18 12 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 24 24 24 2 24 24 24
Agree71 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Agree72 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Agree73 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 23 23 23
















































































































































































































Agree75 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Amend4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Amend7 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Amend8 12 2 17 2 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Amend1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Amend13 3 18 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Amend15 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Artic1 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Artic2 12 12 12 12 12 12 2 2 2 2 2 18 18 2 12 2 2 2 2 2
Benel0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Chart1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Chart2 4 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Compr0 12 12 12 12 12
Const3 4 6 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Const4 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Const5 4 2 7 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Conve1 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Conve3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Conve4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve6 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Conve8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve11 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve15 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve22 22 2 2 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Conve23 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Conve24 2 2 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Conve25 16 16 2 19 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 22 22 22 22 2 2 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Conve27 2 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Conve28 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Conve30 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve31 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve32 22 22 22 12 12 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Conve33 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Conve34 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve35 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve36 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Conve37 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve38 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Conve39 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Conve40 2 22 22 22 22 22 12 12 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Conve41 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve42 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve43 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve46 2 12 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Conve47
Conve48 3 3 3
Conve49 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 24 24 24 2 24 24 24
Conve50 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Conve51 14 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 18 2 18 18 2 18 18 2 18 2 18 18 18 2 2 2 2 2 18 18 2 2 2 2 24 24 24
Conve52 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve53 2 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Conve54 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve55 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 22 22 22 22 22 12 12 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Conve56 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve57 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 24 24 24 2 24 24 24
Conve58 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve60 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 18 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 18 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
















































































































































































































Conve62 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Conve63 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 2 12 2 2 12 2 2 18 18 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Conve64 12 2 12 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Conve66 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve67 19 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve68 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Conve69 3 3 3 3 3 24 24
Conve70 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve71 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 24 24
Conve72 23 2 24 24
Conve73 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve74 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve75 2 18 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve76 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve77 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Conve78 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve80 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Conve82 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 22 22 22 22 2 2 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Conve83 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve84 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 3 3 3 12 12 12 12 12 12
Conve85 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 18 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 18 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Conve86 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Conve89 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 18 18 18 2 2 18 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 18 18 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Conve90 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Conve91 3 3 3 3 3
Conve92 3 3 3 3 1 8 1 8 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3
Conve93 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve94 12 12 12 12 12 12 18 18 12 24 24 24 24 12 12
Conve95 2 24 24 24
Conve96 12 14 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 18 18 2 18 2 2 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 18 2 2 2 2 2 18 18 2 12 25 2 2 24 24
Conve98 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve99 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Conve100 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 24 24 24 3 24 24 24
Conve101 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 18 18 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Conve102 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Conve103 12 12 12 12
Conve104 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve105 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Conve106 18 18 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve107 3 3 3
Conve108 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve109 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve110 3 3
Conve111 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 2 24 24 2 2 24 2
Conve112 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 18 18 18 2 2 18 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 18 18 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Conve113 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve115 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve116 3 3 3 3 3
Conve117 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve118 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conve121 23 23 23 23 23 23
Coope0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Easte0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Energ0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Energ1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Europ0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Europ1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Europ2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Europ3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
















































































































































































































Europ5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Europ6 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Europ7 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Europ8 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Europ9 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Fishe0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Fourt0 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Frame0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Inter0 23 2 2 2 2
Inter1 2 2 2 2
Inter2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 24 24 24 2 24 24 24
Inter3 3 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Inter4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Inter5 15 12 16 16 16 16 16 16 2 19 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 22 22 22 22 2 2 23 2 23 23 2 2 2
Inter6 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Inter10 16 16 2 19 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Inter12 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Inter13 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Inter14 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Inter15 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Inter16 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 15 1 16 16 16 16 16 16 2 19 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 22 22 22 22 2 2 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Inter17 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Inter18 11 12 13 13 13 2 2 2 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Inter19 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 24 24 24 3 24 24 24
Inter21 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Inter22 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Inter23 3 3 3 3 3
Inter24 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 24 2 24 24
Inter25 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Inter26 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Inter27 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Inter28 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Inter29 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Inter30 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 24 24 2 2 24 24 24
Inter31 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 2 2 15 2 16 16 16 16 2 16 2 19 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Inter34 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 2
Inter35 2 2 25 2 2 2 2
Joint0 3 3 3 3
Joint1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Kuwai0 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Kyoto0 23 23 23
Nordi0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Nordi1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
North0 2 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
North1 2 2 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
North2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
North3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Optio0 14 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 18 2 18 18 2 18 18 2 18 2 18 2 18 2 2 2 2 2 18 18 2 2 2 2 2 24 24
Optio1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 18 2 19 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 18 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Plant0 1 9 9 1 9 12 12 12 12 12 15 12 12 12 12 12 12 3 19 19 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 2 2 2 2 2 18 18 2 12 25 12 12 12 2
Proto0 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Proto1 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 24 24 24 3 24 24 24
Proto2 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Proto3 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Proto4 24 24 24 24 24 24
Proto5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Proto6 22 2 2 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Proto7 2 2 2 23 23 2 2 2 2 2
Proto8 2 2 2 22 22 22 22 22 2 2 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
















































































































































































































Proto11 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Proto12 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Proto13 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Proto14 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Proto15 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Proto18 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Proto19 12 12 12 12 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Proto22 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Proto23 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Proto24 2 22 22 22 22 22 12 12 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Proto25 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Proto26 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Proto27 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Proto28 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Proto29 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Proto30 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Proto32 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Proto33 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Proto34 2 22 22 22 22 22 12 12 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Proto35 3 3 3 3 3 8 8 8 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Proto36 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Proto37 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Proto38 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Proto39 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Proto40 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Proto41 3 3 3 3 3
Proto42 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Proto43 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Proto44 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Proto45 3 3 3 3 3
Proto46 3 3 3 3 3 18 3 24 24 24 3 24 24 24
Proto47 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Proto48 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Proto49 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Proto50 22 22 22 18 2 2 23 23 23 24 23 24 24
Proto51 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Proto52 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Proto53 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Proto54 18 2 23 23 3 24 24 23 23
Proto55 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Proto56 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Proto58 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Proto60 3 2 24 24
Proto61 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Proto62 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Proto63 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Proto64 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Proto65 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Proto66 3 3 3
Proto67 3 3 3
Proto68 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Proto69 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Proto70 3 3 3 3
Proto71 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 15 1 16 16 16 16 16 16 2 19 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 22 22 22 22 2 2 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Proto72 18 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Proto73 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Proto74 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Proto75 12 25 12 12 12 12
Proto76 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
















































































































































































































Proto78 3 3 3
Proto79 3 3 3
Provi0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Regio0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Regio1 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Regio2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Revis0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Revis1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Rotte0 12 12 12
Secon0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Singl0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
South0 22 22 22 22 22 2 2 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
South1 12 12 21 12 12 12 12 12 22 22 22 22 22 12 12 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Statu1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Statu4 12 12 12 12 2 2 2 2 2 18 18 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Suppl0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Suppl1 3 3 3
Suppl2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
The_A0 12 12 12 12 12
The_A1 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 15 1 16 16 16 16 16 16 2 19 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 22 22 22 22 2 2 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
The_S0 12 12 22 22 22 22 22 12 12 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Third0 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Third1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Treat0 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 2 18 18 2 12 2 2 12 12 12
Treat1 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Treat6 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Treat8 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Treat9 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Treat10 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Treat11 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 2 12 2 2 2 2 2 18 18 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Treat12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 18 18 2 12 2 12 12 12 12
Treat13 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 18 18 12 12 2 12 12 12 12
Treat14 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Treat15 12 25 12 12 12 12
Unite0 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Unite1 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Vienn0 2 2 2 2 2 12 2 2 12 12 12 12 12 2 2 2 2 12 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Afghanista 1 6 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12 18 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 2 2 2 2 2 18 18 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Albania 4 2 7 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 12 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 12 12 12 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Algeria 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Andorra 12 3 3 3 12 12 12 12
Angola 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Antigua_an 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 12 2 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Argentina 4 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Armenia 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Australia 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 15 1 16 16 16 16 16 16 2 19 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 22 22 22 22 18 2 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Austria 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Azerbaijan 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Bahamas 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 12 2 17 2 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Bahrain 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Bangladesh 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Barbados 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 12 2 2 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Belarus 4 2 7 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 24 24 24 2 24 24 24
Belgium 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Belize 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Benin 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Bhutan 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Bolivia 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Bosnia_and 12 12 3 3 12 12 12 12
















































































































































































































Brazil 2 2 2 2 5 2 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Brunei_Dar 12 12 18 2 2 2 2 2 18 12 12 12 25 12 12 12 12
Bulgaria 3 2 7 2 3 8 8 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Burkina_Fa 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Burundi 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
CTte_dIvo 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Cambodia 6 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 12 12 12 12 12 1 15 1 16 16 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 2 12 2 2 12 2 12 18 18 12 12 25 12 12 12 12
Cameroon 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Canada 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 15 1 16 16 16 16 2 16 2 19 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 23 23 3 3 3 3 3
Cape_Verde 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Central_Af 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Chad 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Chile 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
China 4 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 18 2 2 2 12 12 12 12 12 12 18 2 2 2 2 18 2 2 12 12 23 2 23 24 24
Colombia 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Comoros 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Congo 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Costa_Rica 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Croatia 12 12 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Cuba 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Cyprus 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Czech_Repu 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 3 12 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Democratic 12 12 12 12 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 24 24 24 12 24 24 24
Denmark 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Djibouti 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Dominica 11 12 13 13 13 2 2 2 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Dominican 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Ecuador 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Egypt 1 3 3 1 1 8 1 8 3 2 2 3 3 12 2 2 2 2 12 12 12 12 12 12 18 12 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
El_Salvado 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Equatorial 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 18 18 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Eritrea 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Estonia 3 3 3 3 3 8 8 8 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 12 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Ethiopia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Fiji 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 23 12 12 23 23 23
Finland 1 1 7 3 1 8 1 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 18 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
France 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Gabon 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Gambia 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Georgia 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 3 3
Germany 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Ghana 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 18 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Greece 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Grenada 17 17 17 17 17 17 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 12 2 2 2 2 12 12 12 12 2 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Guatemala 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Guinea 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Guinea-Bis 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Guyana 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 2 12 2 2
Haiti 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Honduras 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Hungary 4 6 7 2 1 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12 1 1 1 12 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Iceland 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
India 1 1 3 1 1 8 1 8 9 3 9 12 12 14 2 2 15 2 16 16 16 16 2 3 19 19 3 2 2 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 18 2 2 2 2 2 2 18 2 12 25 2 2 2 2
Indonesia 4 6 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 18 18 19 12 2 2 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 18 2 2 2 2 2 18 18 2 12 25 12 12 12 12
Iran_Isla 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 18 18 18 2 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 2 24 2 2 2 2 2
Iraq 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 18 18 24 12 2 2 12 12 12
Ireland 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Israel 3 3 3 5 5 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 24 24 24 2 24 24 24
Italy 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
















































































































































































































Japan 3 3 1 1 5 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 12 15 12 16 16 16 16 16 16 2 19 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 22 22 22 22 2 2 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Jordan 4 6 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 18 12 18 18 18 12 12 12 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 24 24 24 2 24 24 24
Kazakhstan 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Kenya 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Kiribati 12 12 21 12 12 12 12 12 22 22 12 22 22 12 12 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Kuwait 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Kyrgyzstan 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Lao_People 6 1 1 1 1 1 9 9 1 9 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 18 18 12 12 25 12 12 12 12
Latvia 3 3 3 3 3 8 8 8 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 12 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Lebanon 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 2 12 2 2 12 12 12 12 12 12 2 18 2 2 2 2 2 18 18 2 2 2 2 2 24 24
Lesotho 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Liberia 4 2 7 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 18 18 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 12 2 2 2 2 12 12 12 12 2 12 2 12 12 12 12
Libyan_Ara 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Liechtenst 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 18 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Lithuania 3 3 3 3 3 8 8 8 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 12 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Luxembourg 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Macedonia 12 12 3 3 3 3 3 3
Madagascar 12 12 1 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 18 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Malawi 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Malaysia 2 2 2 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 18 18 12 12 25 12 12 12 12
Maldives 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 18 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Mali 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Malta 12 3 3 3 3 3 3 12 12 12 12 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Marshall 2 22 22 22 22 22 12 12 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Mauritania 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Mauritius 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Mexico 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Micronesia 22 22 22 22 22 12 12 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Moldova 12 12 12 3 3 12 3 3 3
Monaco 3 6 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 12 14 1 3 1 3 1 3 3 3 3 3 18 3 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Mongolia 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 24 24 24 12 12 12 12
Morocco 1 2 2 2 2 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Mozambique 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Myanmar 4 6 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Namibia 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Nauru 12 12 21 12 12 12 12 12 22 22 22 22 22 12 12 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Nepal 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12 18 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 2 12 2 2 2 2 2 18 18 2 12 2 12 12 12 2
Netherland 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
New_Zealan 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 15 1 16 16 16 16 16 16 2 19 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 22 22 22 22 18 2 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Nicaragua 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Niger 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Nigeria 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Norway 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Oman 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Pakistan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 18 12 18 2 12 18 12 12 12 12 12 12 2 12 2 2 2 2 2 18 18 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Palau 2 22 22 22 22 22 12 12 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Panama 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Papua_New 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 22 22 22 22 22 12 12 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Paraguay 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Peru 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Philippine 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 12 14 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 18 2 18 18 2 18 18 2 18 2 18 2 18 2 2 2 2 2 18 18 2 2 2 2 2 24 24
Poland 1 1 1 1 1 8 1 8 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Portugal 3 3 3 3 3 8 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Qatar 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Republic_o 4 6 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 18 18 12 12 25 23 12 12 12
Romania 3 3 3 3 3 8 8 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Russian_Fe 4 2 5 2 1 2 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 16 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 3 18 18 18 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Rwanda 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Sahrawi_De 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12















































































































































































































Saint_Luci 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Saint_Vinc 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 12 2 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Samoa 12 12 1 15 1 16 16 16 16 16 16 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 22 22 22 22 22 12 12 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
San_Marino 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 24 12 12 12 12 12 12
Sao_Tome_a 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Saudi_Arab 4 2 7 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 2 2 2 2 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Senegal 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Seychelles 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Sierra_Leo 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Singapore 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 18 18 12 12 25 12 12 12 12
Slovakia 3 3 12 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Slovenia 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 18 12 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 12 12 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Solomon_Is 12 12 12 21 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 22 12 12 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Somalia 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
South_Afri 4 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 2 15 2 16 16 16 16 16 16 2 19 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 22 22 22 22 2 2 23 23 23 23 23 24 24
Spain 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Sri_Lanka 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 18 18 19 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 2 2 2 2 2 18 18 2 12 2 12 12 12 2
Sudan 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Suriname 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 12 2 2 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Swaziland 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Sweden 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Switzerlan 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Syrian_Ara 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 18 18 18 18 18 24 24 24 2 24 24 24
Taiwan 12 12 1 15 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 2 12 2 2 12 2 2 18 18 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Tajikistan 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Thailand 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 18 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 18 18 2 2 25 2 2 2 2
Togo 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Tonga 12 12 21 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 23 23 23 23 23 23
Trinidad_a 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 2 2 2 2 2 12 2 2 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 2 2 2 2 2 12 12 2 2 2 12 2 2 2
Tunisia 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12 1 12 1 1 1 12 12 12 12 12 12 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Turkey 1 1 1 1 1 8 3 8 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Turkmenist 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Tuvalu 12 12 21 12 12 12 12 12 22 22 22 22 22 12 12 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Uganda 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Ukraine 4 2 7 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 24 24 24 3 3 24 3
United_Ara 12 14 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
United_Kin 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
United_Rep 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
United_Sta 2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 15 1 16 16 16 16 16 16 2 19 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 22 22 22 22 2 2 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Uruguay 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Uzbekistan 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Vanuatu 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Venezuela 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Viet_Nam 6 1 1 1 1 1 9 9 1 9 12 12 12 12 12 15 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 18 18 12 12 25 12 12 12 12
Yemen 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 18 18 18 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 18 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Yugoslavia 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 14 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 24 24 2 2 24 24 24
Zaire 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Zambia 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Zimbabwe 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
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